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                   October 9, 2017 
 
MODEL RULE 8.4(g): BLATANTLY UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND BLATANTLY POLITICAL 
-- George W. Dent, Jr.1 
 
I. Introduction 
In 2016 the American Bar Association adopted a new Rule 8.4(g) in its Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct.2 The rule provides, inter alia, that a lawyer may not “engage in conduct 
that the lawyer knows or reasonably should know is harassment or discrimination on the basis 
of” several listed factors “in conduct related to the practice of law.” Comment 3 to the new rule 
provides that “discrimination” in the rule “includes harmful verbal or physical conduct that 
manifests bias or prejudice towards others.”3 
The new rule goes beyond existing Model Rule 8.4(d), which forbids “conduct that is 
prejudicial to the administration of justice.”4 Comment 3 to Rule 8.4 was amended in 1998 to 
state that the rule is violated if a lawyer “knowingly manifests by words or conduct bias or 
                                                 
1 Professor of Law. Case Western Reserve University School of Law. The author thanks Brad Abramson, 
Josh Blackman, and Cassandra Robertson for their extremely helpful comments. 
2 Rule 8.4, as amended, provides:  
It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to: 
. . . .  
(g) engage in conduct that the lawyer knows or reasonably should know is harassment or 
discrimination on the basis of race, sex, religion, national origin, ethnicity, disability, age, 
sexual orientation, gender identity, marital status or socioeconomic status in conduct 
related to the practice of law. This paragraph does not limit the ability of a lawyer to 
accept, decline or withdraw from a representation in accordance with Rule 1.16. This 
paragraph does not preclude legitimate advice or advocacy consistent with these Rules. 
3 The Comment reads in full: 
Discrimination and harassment by lawyers in violation of paragraph (g) undermine 
confidence in the legal profession and the legal system. Such discrimination includes 
harmful verbal or physical conduct that manifests bias or prejudice towards others. 
Harassment includes sexual harassment and derogatory or demeaning verbal or physical 
conduct. Sexual harassment includes unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual 
favors, and other unwelcome verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature. The 
substantive law of antidiscrimination and anti-harassment statutes and case law may 
guide application of paragraph (g). 
4 MODEL RULES PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.4(d) (1998). 
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prejudice . . . in the course of representing a client.”5 Thus the new rule effects several major 
changes. It extends its prohibition to behavior that a lawyer does not know, but “reasonably 
should know,” violates the rule. It expands the list of prohibited bases for discrimination.6 Most 
significantly, it expands the scope of covered activities from conduct that is “prejudicial to the 
administration of justice” or that occurs “in the course of representing a client” to encompass all 
“conduct related to the practice of law.” 
New Rule 8.4(g) raises a host of troubling questions, including the wisdom of replacing 
the old scienter standard with a negligence standard and the propriety of the bar’s dictating labor 
law for lawyers. However, by far the biggest problems with the new rule are its breadth and 
vagueness that clearly threaten conduct protected by the First Amendment; its viewpoint 
discrimination, which also violates the First Amendment; and its potential to be applied 
selectively as a partisan political weapon. One wonders how the august ABA could have 
approved such a blatantly unconstitutional stricture. 
Part II of this article explores the history of Rule 8.4(g), focusing on the reasons given for 
its adoption. Part III considers issues of interpretation and implementation of the new rule. Part 
IV analyzes the rule’s First Amendment problems. Part V looks at the rule’s unprecedented 
intrusion by the bar into the regulation of employment law. Part VI discusses how the ABA 
could have adopted such an egregiously unconstitutional rule. Part VII concludes. 
 
II. The Campaign for Rule 8.4(g) 
What were the problems with the old rule? What abuses did the ABA cite to explain the 
need for a much broader rule? A report by the ABA Ethics Committee listed examples justifying 
adoption of the new rule.7 Presumably the Ethics Committee cited the worst incidents it could 
find, but even some of these incidents are hardly atrocities. In one, a lawyer representing his wife 
and her business in a dispute with a Canadian employee sent the judge two ex parte 
communications with statements like “are you going to believe an alien or a U.S. citizen?”8 
Taken together, they hardly suggest an epidemic of intolerance ravaging the profession. 
                                                 
5 MODEL RULES PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8, cmt. 3 (2014). 
6 See infra notes 106-09 and accompanying text. 
7 Report of the Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility 6 (Aug. 2016). Professor 
Stephen Gillers reports that “the targets of the [inappropriate] conduct are predominantly women” and 
that the “reported decisions suggest that biased conduct based on race or ethnicity occurs less often.” 
Stephen Gillers, A Rule to Forbid Bias and Harassment in Law Practice: A Guide for State Courts 
Considering Model Rule 8.4(g), x GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS x, x [5] (2017). Professor Gillers concedes that, 
“[j]udging by reported decisions only, bias and harassment in the practice of law is a persistent but not a 
pervasive problem.” Gillers, supra, at [4] (emphasis in original). However, he gives no evidence of the 
magnitude of the problem apart from reported decisions. 
8 In re McGrath, 280 P.3d 1091 (2012). 
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Moreover, in the cases cited by the Ethics Committee the offenders were disciplined 
under existing rules. Neither that committee nor anyone else documented cases of outrageous 
behavior that went unpunished but would be barred by the new rule. Professor Gillers admitted 
the lack of such cases but pronounced it “irrelevant”!9 Instead, the rule was justified by a 
supposed need for a “cultural shift” and because it “tells the public who we are.”10 
Despite the absence of a strong demonstrated need for a new rule, it was adopted hastily, 
with little opportunity for scrutiny of the substantially revised final draft.11 The biggest change in 
the new rule is the extension to “conduct related to the practice of law,” but almost none of the 
cases cited by the Committee occurred outside the practice of law. 12 One case it cited was the 
disbarment of President Bill Clinton for giving evasive and misleading answers to questions in a 
deposition, in violation of a judge’s order, in an effort to conceal the true nature of his 
relationship with Monica Lewinsky.13 However, the court specifically found that this behavior 
was prejudicial to the administration of justice. Another was a case of sexual harassment 
(including highly offensive sexual contact) by a lawyer acting as an adjunct professor.14 This 
kind of behavior could have been addressed in  a much narrower rule. The ABA showed no need 
to police exclusively verbal conduct that does not amount to harassment and is merely related to 
the practice of law. 
The ABA’s Model Rules are, of course, just that; a model that binds no one unless and 
until adopted by state supreme courts, which may either stop short of the provisions of the Model 
Rules or go beyond them. The response of the states to Rule 8.4(d) and Comment 3 is instructive. 
Again, the old rule applied only to “conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice.” 
Old Comment 3 applied only to conduct “in the course of representing a client.” Despite these 
limitations, the adoption of old Comment 3 gave rise to serious First Amendment concerns.15 
Perhaps that is why fewer than half the states have followed 8.4(d).16   
                                                 
9 See infra note 27 and accompanying text. 
10 See infra notes 28, 30 and accompanying text 
11 See Andrew F. Halaby & Brianna L. Long, New Model Rule of Professional Conduct 8.4(g): 
Legislative History, Enforceability Questions, and a Call for Scholarship, 41 J. LEGAL PROF. 201, 211-32 
(2017).  
12 Professor Gillers refers only to conduct “in the practice of law.” Gillers, supra note 7, at [4]. He offers 
no evidence of problems in conduct merely “related to the practice of law.” 
13 Neal v. Clinton, 2001 WL 334355768 (Ark. Cir. Ct. Jan. 19, 2001). 
14 In re Griffith, 838 N.W.2d 792 (2013). 
15 See Lindsey Keiser, Lawyers Lack Liberty: State Codifications of Comment 3 of Rule 8.4 Impinge on 
Lawyers’ First Amendment Rights, 28 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 629 (2015). 
16 “Today, twenty-four states and Washington, D.C., have [an anti-bias] rule.” Gillers, supra note 7, at 
[13]. An even smaller number transferred the language of Comment 3 into the rule. . . .” See Keiser, supra 
note 15, at 629 (stating that only seventeen states and the District of Columbia had “elevated Comment 3, 
or some version of it, into the Rule itself”). 
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Moreover, none of the state rules was as broad as the new rule,17 and so far only one state 
has adopted the new rule, while in several states official objections have been registered.18 Most 
regulate only conduct “‘in the course of representing a client’ or its equivalent. Most state rules 
tie the forbidden conduct to a lawyer’s work in connection with the ‘administration of justice’ or, 
more specifically, to a matter before a tribunal.”19 None has sought to discipline speech in 
activities merely related to the practice of law.20 Nonetheless, the Committee cited not a single 
case where heinous conduct escaped sanction because existing rules were too narrow. In other 
words, even by the Committee’s own brief, the new rule seems to be a solution for a non-existent 
problem. 
To bolster the Ethics Committee’s case Professor Gillers offers a litany of cases he has 
found “[o]ver the years, for my casebook and continuing legal education talks” that “address 
biased or harassing comments.”21 A couple involve outrageous conduct.22 Most involve 
derogatory comments made during litigation that would be dismissed as bad manners but not 
causes for discipline except that they alluded to someone’s sex or ethnicity. In some cases it is 
not even clear whether a comment referred to sex or race.23 Certainly, one could find much more 
abusive comments involving matters other than race or sex. More important, all these cases 
involved conduct in the practice of law. If they prejudice the administration of justice, they can 
                                                 
17 Gillers, supra note 7, at [13]. 
18 Only Vermont has adopted the new rule. See Andrew Stickler, Vermont’s Anti-Bias Rule Vote an 
Outlier, Law360 (Aug. 14, 2017), at https://www.law360.com/articles/953530/vermont-s-anti-bias-rule-
vote-an-outlier-in-heated-debate. The Montana passed by a large margin a resolution opposing adoption. 
See Matthew Perlman, Mont. Lawmakers Say ABA Anti-Bias Rule Is Unconstitutional, Law360 (Aug. 14, 
2017), at https://www.law360.com/articles/913579/mont-lawmakers-say-aba-anti-bias-rule-is-
unconstitutional. See also Suevon Lee, Texas AG Says ABA Ethics Rules Restricts Speech, Religion, 
Law360 (Dec. 20, 2016), at https://www.law360.com/articles/875243/texas-ag-says-aba-ethics-rule-
restricts-speech-religion; Louisiana Attorney General Opinion 17-0114 (Sept. 8, 2017) (state attorney 
general expresses opinion that ABA Rule 8.4(g) would be unconstitutional if adopted); ISBA Assembly 
Opposes Adoption of 8.4(g) in Illinois, 2Civility (Jan. 1, 2017), at https://www.2civility.org/isba-
assembly-opposes-adoption-8-4g-illinois (assembly of Illinois State Bar Association registers opposition 
to Rule 8.4(g)); Josh Blackman, Vermont Quietly Adopts ABA Model Rule 8.4(g), Other States Should 
“Pause,” at http://joshblackman.com/blog/2017/08/21/vermont-quietly-adopts-aba-model-rule-8-4g-
other-states-should-pause (listing some other official expressions of opposition to the rule). 
19 Gillers, supra note 7, at [13-14]; see also Josh Blackman, Reply: A Pause for State Courts Considering 
Model Rule 8.4(g), 30 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS x, x (2017). 
20 See Blackman, supra note 19, at x. 
21 Gillers, supra note 7, at x [Appendix]. 
22 E.g., In re Schiff, 599 N.Y.S.2d 242 (1st Dep’t 1993) (during a deposition “respondent was unduly 
intimidating and abusive toward the defendant's counsel, and he directed vulgar, obscene and sexist 
epithets toward her anatomy and gender.”). 
23 E.g., in In re Monaghan, 743 N.Y.S.2d 519, 520 (1st Dep’t 2002), the respondent criticized opposing 
counsel, an African-American, for her alleged mispronunciation of the words “establish” and 
“especially.”  
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be addressed under existing rules. They do not show any need to regulate the speech of lawyers 
in conduct merely related to the practice of law. 
Comment 3 to Rule 8.4 offers a somewhat different justification for the new rule: 
“Discrimination and harassment by lawyers in violation of paragraph (g) undermine confidence 
in the legal profession and the legal system.”24 What empirical evidence is offered to show that 
discrimination by lawyers on the basis of, for example, gender identity—either in the course of 
the administration of justice or in conduct merely “related to the practice of law”--has had this 
effect? None. Neither is any evidence—even anecdotal evidence—offered to show that any of 
the skimpy handful of incidents cited above has “undermine[d] confidence in the legal 
profession.” Certainly, proponents of the rule have never adduced any evidence that statements 
made in CLE or law school presentations have “undermine[d] confidence in the legal profession 
and the legal system.” 
Some behavior within this rubric, like racial discrimination by law firms in employment 
or “severe or pervasive” sexual harassment in law firms could undermine that confidence, but 
this behavior is already illegal under state and federal laws,25 and Rule 8.4(g) is not limited to 
such behavior. It is hard to know what the public knows or believes about politics and 
government and how accurate its knowledge and beliefs are,26 but certainly the public should 
understand that even a blatantly racist statement by a lawyer does not constitute a systemic 
problem in the legal profession or legal system. 
Professor Gillers recognizes the lack of evidence demonstrating a need for the new rule, 
but he says that “the full extent of biased conduct is . . . irrelevant”!27 The motive for the 
amendment is made explicit in a statement quoted in a Memorandum from the Ethics 
Committee: 
There is a need for a cultural shift in understanding the inherent integrity of 
people regardless of their race, color, national origin, religion, age, sex, gender 
identity, gender expression, sexual orientation, marital status, or disability, to be 
captured in the rules of professional conduct.28 
                                                 
24 MODEL RULES PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8, cmt. 3 (2016). 
25 See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (barring employment 
discrimination based on race or sex (including sexual harassment)); see also infra notes 40-41 and 
accompanying text. 
26 See ILYA SOMIN, DEMOCRACY AND POLITICAL IGNORANCE: WHY SMALLER GOVERNMENT IS 
SMARTER x (2013) (“One of the biggest problems with modern democracy is that most of the public is 
usually ignorant of politics and government.”). 
27 Gillers, supra note 7, at [5]. 
28 Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Draft Proposal to Amend Model Rule 
8.4 at 2 (Dec. 22, 2015), quoting a proposal from the Oregon New Lawyers Division, available at 
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_responsibility/rule_8_4_langu
age_choice_memo_12_22_2015.authcheckdam.pdf [hereinafter Standing Committee, Draft Proposal]. 
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Professor Gillers offers two similar grounds. First, the rule “tells the bar as a whole that 
its licensing authority deems the behavior the rule describes as unacceptable.”29 “Second, 
adoption of Rule 8.4(g) tells the public that the legal profession will not tolerate this conduct, not 
solely when aimed at other lawyers, but at anyone. The Rule tells the public who we are.”30 
ABA Model Rule 8.4(d) already forbids lawyers to “engage in conduct that is prejudicial 
to the administration of justice,”31 so the new rule serves only to extend sanctions to conduct that 
is not “prejudicial to the administration of justice.” Thus the question is whether it is appropriate 
and permissible under the First Amendment for the bar to proscribe behavior that does not 
prejudice the administration of justice simply because the bar establishment “deems the behavior 
. . . unacceptable” and wants to conscript all lawyers into a campaign to project to the public the 
control group’s notion of “who we are”? This question will be considered below.32 
 The ABA previously acknowledged the First Amendment and Due Process difficulties of 
an anti-bias rule, even a much narrower one than new 8.4(g). In 1995 the ABA Ethics Committee 
abandoned an attempt to draft an anti-bias rule in part because it “determined that no disciplinary 
rule could be drawn that would, to its satisfaction, meet the standards of precision and therefore 
standards of due process, and would also not unduly impinge on the First Amendment.”33 A 
1998 report to the ABA expressed similar concerns, because “manifestations of bias and 
prejudice may include protected speech, and because race, gender, and other factors are 
sometimes legitimate subjects of consideration and comment in the legal process.”34 
Some commentators argued that the term “harassment” in the new rule was too vague to 
give fair warning of what is forbidden and might be unconstitutional.35 The comment to Rule 
8.4(g) offers little help. It says that harassment or sexual harassment “includes” certain behavior, 
but does not say that it is confined to such behavior.36 It states further: “The substantive law of . . 
. anti-harassment statutes and case law may guide application of paragraph (g).”37 Or it may not; 
the comment shows that the rule is not limited by those statutes and case law, including the 
“severe or pervasive” standard. The Report of the Standing Committee on Ethics and 
Professional Responsibility in support of Rule 8.4(g) underscores this point. It says that the 
                                                 
29 Gillers, supra note 7, at x. 
30 Id. at  [6]. 
31 MODEL RULES PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.4(d) (1998). 
32 See infra notes 143-308 and accompanying text. 
33 Annual Report of the American Bar Association Including the Proceedings of the One Hundred 
Eighteenth Annual Meeting of the House of Delegates at 61 (1995). 
34 Annual Report of the American Bar Association Including Proceedings of the Sixtieth Midyear 
Meeting of the House of Delegates at 82 (1998). 
35 See Gillers, supra note 7, at [21 & n.85]. 
36 MODEL RULES PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8, cmt. 3 (2016). 
37 Id.  
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comment “makes clear that the substantive law on antidiscrimination and anti-harassment is not 
necessarily dispositive in the disciplinary context.”38 
Professor Gillers expresses dismay over these reservations, noting that “Anti-
discrimination and anti-harassment rules regulate many American institutions, public and 
private, and populate many statutes and agency rules of the federal and local governments.”39 He 
is right, but the rules to which he refers regulate actions affecting matters like employment and 
housing. To prove denial of housing or of an employment opportunity requires objective 
evidence.  
The harm required to constitute harassment is less concrete but, as Gillers acknowledges, 
sexual harassment in employment is actionable only if it is “sufficiently severe or pervasive ‘to 
alter the conditions of [the victim’s] employment and create an abusive working 
environment.’”40 In education the test is even more restrictive: “[A]n action will lie only for 
harassment that is so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive that it effectively bars the 
victim’s access to an educational opportunity or benefit.”41  
Rule 8.4(g) requires neither objective evidence of harm nor “severe, pervasive, and 
objectively offensive behavior.” It requires only that the accused have uttered a statement about a 
listed matter that someone considers “unreasoned” and, maybe, that someone have been bothered 
by the statement.42 Thus the rule is much vaguer and more subjective than any other rule against 
discrimination or harassment. 
Professor Gillers argues that many terms in the Model Rules are just as vague as 
“harassment” in 8.4(g).43 However, even if he is right that the rule is not unconstitutional, its 
vagueness is another reason for state bars to reject the rule as drafted as bad policy. Moreover, 
the other terms he cites do not generally entail speech, and especially not speech that does not 
prejudice the administration of justice or that is not even uttered in the practice of law. Given the 
astonishing breadth of Rule 8.4(g), its vagueness raises serious First Amendment problems.44 
 
III. Issues of Interpretation and Implementation 
                                                 
38 Report of the Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility 7 (Aug. 2016). 
39 Gillers, supra note 7, at x [10]. 
40 Gillers, supra note 7, at  [10 n.43] (quoting Meritor Savings Bank FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 
(1986). 
41 Davis v. Monroe Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 633 (1999). 
42 Whether the rule requires proof of any kind of harm at all is unclear. See infra notes 117-35 and 
accompanying text. 
43 Gillers, supra note 7, at [23]. 
44 See infra notes 150-57 and accompanying text. 
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 Rule 8.4(g) features a new term—“conduct related to the practice of law;” a new standard 
of culpability; and three terms—“bias or prejudice,” “discrimination on the basis of,” and 
“manifest”—that are carried over from the old rule and comments, but that take on much greater 
significance because of the wider scope of the new rule. It is also unclear whether the rule 
requires proof of harm and, if it does, what kind of harm; and who has standing to file a 
complaint under the rule. 
 A. Conduct “Related to the Practice of Law,” Including Classroom Teaching 
Existing Rule 8.4(d) is limited to “conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of 
justice.” New Rule 8.4(g) extends to all “conduct related to the practice of law.” Comment 4 
explains this phrase: 
Conduct related to the practice of law includes representing clients; interacting 
with witnesses, coworkers, court personnel, lawyers and others while engaged in 
the practice of law; operating or managing a law firm or law practice; and 
participating in bar association, business or social activities in connection with the 
practice of law. Lawyers may engage in conduct undertaken to promote diversity 
and inclusion without violating this Rule by, for example, implementing 
initiatives aimed at recruiting, hiring, retaining and advancing diverse employees 
or sponsoring diverse law student organizations.45 
The legislative history of Rule 8.4(g) illuminates its unprecedented scope. The Ethics 
Committee Report refers to “organized bar-related activities to promote access to the legal 
system and improvements in the law.”46 The latter would include any talk or debate about 
possible legislation. The Report also mentions “social activities in connection with the practice 
of law.”47 This would include a firm golf outing or lunch with a client and any event at which a 
lawyer discussed the law. If a lawyer travels to a law-related event, the entire journey is 
“connect[ed] with the practice of law.” Any talk to any group by a lawyer about the law would 
be “conduct related to the practice of law.” A letter to the editor of a newspaper or an entry on a 
blog or in other social media would seem to be “conduct related to the practice of law” if the 
author is identified as a lawyer. The constitutionality of this extension of the bar’s regulation will 
be taken up below.48 
Many protest demonstrations and rallies concern legal issues and would seem to be 
“conduct related to the practice of law,” at least for a lawyer who participates in the action as a 
lawyer. A lawyer who denounced the wealthy as greedy at an Occupy Wall Street demonstration 
and demanded tax increases on the wealthy, for example, might be deemed to be engaged in 
                                                 
45 MODEL RULES PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8, cmt. 4 (2016). 
46 Report of the Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility 10 (Aug. 2016). 
47 Id. See also Standing Committee, Draft Proposal, supra note 28 (stating that the coverage of the new 
rule “would include conduct at activities such as law firm dinners and events at which lawyers were 
present solely because of their association with the firm”). 
48 See infra notes 143-308 and accompanying text. 
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“conduct related to the practice of law” and to violate the rule by manifesting bias based on 
socioeconomic status. A lawyer acting as an instructor in a law school class or interacting with 
students is engaged in “conduct related to the practice of law.”49 Publishing an article about the 
law would be “conduct related to the practice of law.” 
Brendan Eich was forced out as CEO of Mozilla because he had contributed $1,000 to the 
campaign for California’s Proposition 8, which limited marriage to one man and one woman.50 
Could a lawyer be charged under Rule 8.4(g) for the same behavior? Although the campaign is 
certainly related to law, the lawyer’s financial contribution is no different from a layman’s, so it 
is probably not “conduct related to the practice of law.” If the gift were made by a law firm, 
however, it could be deemed to violate the rule. 
 B. The Culpability Standard 
Earlier proposals for an ABA anti-bias rule forbade only knowing conduct.51 The new 
rule forbids “conduct that the lawyer knows or reasonably should know is harassment or 
discrimination . . . .” (emphasis added). This is essentially a negligence standard. There is no 
authority to explain what the term means; no state anti-bias rule had such a term when the ABA 
adopted the new rule.52 
Given the extreme breadth of expressions that have been condemned as racist, sexist, 
homophobic, etc., it is not at all clear what a lawyer “reasonably should know” is subject to such 
condemnation. How well-informed and sophisticated is a lawyer required to be? The President of 
Smith College and others were vilified for saying “all lives matter.”53 Should a lawyer 
“reasonably know” that such language is harmful and discriminatory? Should a lawyer 
“reasonably know” that criticizing opposing counsel’s pronunciation of the words “establish” 
and “especially” would be considered racial bias?54 Or referring to a person as “the black man” 
or “the black guy”?55 Would referring to a person as a “white guy” or an “Italian guy” be a 
manifestation of prejudice? 
                                                 
49 In In re Griffith, 838 N.W.2d 792 (Minn. 2013), the court found that a lawyer who “engaged in 
unwelcome physical contact of a sexual nature . . . with respect to a law student he had taught and was 
supervising in an independent clinic” violated, inter alia, Minnesota Rule of Professional Conduct 8.4(g), 
which applies to conduct “in connection with a lawyer’s professional activities.” 
50 See infra note 88 and accompanying text. 
51 In 2015 the Ethics Committee proposed to forbid a lawyer to “harass or knowingly discriminate.” 
Standing Committee Draft Proposal, supra note 28. 
52 See Halaby & Long, supra note 11, at 253 n.275. 
53 See Jessica Chasmar, Liberal on Liberal Attack: Smith College President Apologizes for Email Saying 
“All Lives Matter,” WASH. TIMES, Dec. 9, 2014, available at 
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/dec/9/smith-college-president-apologizes-for-email-sayin. 
54 See In re Monaghan, 743 N.Y.S.2d 519, 520 (1st Dep’t 2002).  
55 See In re Thomsen, 837 N.E.2d 1011, 1012 (Ind. 2010). 
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Political correctness condemns microaggressions, which may be committed 
“unconsciously,”56 but perhaps a lawyer “reasonably should know” what behavior constitutes a 
microaggression. As the experience of the Smith College President shows, the politically correct 
definition of bias is continuously and rapidly expanding, so lawyers may have to update 
themselves constantly about what is the new taboo. 
The “reasonably should know” standard is particularly troubling because professional 
discipline is punishment. The Supreme Court has called it “quasi-criminal.”57 A lawyer can be 
deprived of the ability to earn a living if she is found to have violated the rule. The breadth and 
vagueness of the “reasonably should know” standard exacerbate the rule’s First Amendment 
problems.58 
C. “Bias or Prejudice” 
Comment 3 says that Rule 8.4(g) forbids “verbal . . . conduct that manifests bias or 
prejudice toward others.” The terms “bias or prejudice” are problematic. They are not defined in 
the rule or the comment. Unlike “harassment or discrimination,” they are not common legal 
terms.  The potential for confusion about their meaning is not fanciful; uncertainty about the 
meaning of “bias” is already a problem with the “bias reporting systems” imposed by many 
colleges and universities.59 
The terms “bias or prejudice” were used in former comment 3 to Rule 8.4(d), but that 
comment was adopted by the ABA only in 2014, and most states have not adopted it.60 As a 
result, there is almost no case law interpreting these terms. The dictionary defines bias as “an 
inclination of temperament or outlook; esp: [but not only] a personal and sometimes unreasoned 
judgment : PREJUDICE.”61 “Prejudice” is similarly defined as “an adverse opinion or leaning 
formed without just grounds or before sufficient knowledge.”62 I will take it on faith that no 
disciplinary committee will apply the rule to inclinations that it considers well-reasoned, but 
which inclinations are not well reasoned?  
In matters of taste, reasonable people can agree to disagree. I can disagree with your 
preferences in, for example, music, art, or wine, without feeling that your preferences are 
                                                 
56 Hannah Yi, What Exactly Is a Microaggression? Let These Examples from Hollywood Movies Explain, 
QUARTZ, available at https://qz.com/787504/what-exactly-is-a-microaggression-let-these-examples-from-
hollywood-movies-explain. 
57 In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544, 551 (1968). 
58 See infra notes 143-57 and accompanying text. 
59 See Foundation for Individual Rights in Education, Bias Response Team Report 2017, at 
https://www.thefire.org/first-amendment-library/special-collections/fire-guides/report-on-bias-reporting-
systems-2017/ [hereinafter FIRE Bias Response Report]. 
60 See supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
61 MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 110 (10th ed. 1993). 
62 Id. at 919. 
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“unreasoned.” Most political controversies are different; each side considers the views of the 
other side wrong, “unreasoned.” Rarely does anyone say “Your views are well reasoned, but I 
think they are wrong.” 
The First Amendment generally forbids those in power to bar speech simply because they 
consider it biased, wrong, “unreasoned,” or even outrageous.63 New Rule 8.4(g), as illuminated 
by comment 3, however, forbids speech that, in the opinion of the members of a tribunal, 
manifests “bias”—i.e., is unreasoned--in enumerated categories in “conduct related to the 
practice of law.” The rule, then, is a weapon for the exercise of raw political power; the power to 
decide which views about public issues are well-reasoned and permitted and which “manifest . . .  
bias or prejudice” and should be punished. 
The range of mainstream opinions that could be barred by this rule almost unlimited. 
Professor Blackman lists eleven areas that are potentially particularly troubling.64 Consider 
Lawrence Summers’ statement about sexual imbalance among top mathematicians.65 He noted a 
hypothesis of greater variability among men (compared to women) in tests of cognitive abilities, 
leading to proportionally more males than females at both the lower and upper tails of the test 
score distributions. He then said that "even small differences in the standard deviation [between 
the sexes] will translate into very large differences in the available pool substantially out [from 
the mean]."66 Summers cited research finding differences between the standard deviations of 
males and females in the top 5% of twelfth graders under various tests. He then argued that, if 
this research were accurate, "whatever the set of attributes . . . that are precisely defined to 
correlate with being an aeronautical engineer at MIT or being a chemist at Berkeley . . . are 
probably different in their standard deviations as well."67 Many experts believe that women and 
men have essential differences beyond their reproductive organs.68 Others disagree,69 as Dr. 
Summers discovered when he was forced out as president of Harvard over his comments. 
                                                 
63 See infra notes 143-71 and accompanying text. 
64 Blackman, supra note 19, at x. 
65 See Lawrence H. Summers, Remarks at NBER Conference on Diversifying the Science & Engineering 
Workforce (Jan. 14, 2005), at http://www.harvard.edu/president/speeches/summers_2005/nber.php. 
66 Id. 
67 Id. 
68 See generally STEVEN PINKER, THE BLANK SLATE: THE MODERN DENIAL OF HUMAN NATURE 343-50 
(2002); DAVID C. GEARY, FEMALE: THE EVOLUTION OF HUMAN SEX DIFFERENCES (1968); Debra W. 
Soh, Dismissing Gender Science Undermines a Noble Cause, Plain Dealer (Cleveland), Feb. 20, 2017 
(“studies have shown sex differences across a wide variety of cognitive domains”); Dorion Sagan, Gender 
Specifics: Why Women Aren’t Men, N.Y. TIMES, June 21, 1998, § 1, at 1 (stating that hormonal 
differences affect all organs of the body, abilities, behaviors, and effects of medication). 
69 See CORDELIA FINE, TESTOSTERONE REX: MYTHS OF SEX, SCIENCE, AND SOCIETY (2017); Elizabeth S. 
Spelke, Sex Differences in Intrinsic Aptitude for Mathematics and Science? A Critical Review, 60 AM. 
PSYCH. 950 (Dec. 2005). 
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Whatever one thinks about Summers’ expulsion from Harvard, his legal rights were not 
violated. Lawyers, however, do have some rights in bar membership, including First Amendment 
rights. If a lawyer ascribed the sexual imbalance among large law firm partners in part to the 
same reasons that Summers cited, could the lawyer be disbarred under Rule 8.4(g)? Given the 
political fervor of the promoters of the new rule—evidenced, for example, by their demand for a 
“cultural shift”70—it is easy to imagine such a result. Even if the lawyer did escape punishment, 
either by a favorable ruling from a disciplinary committee or by an appeal to the courts, she 
would have lost substantial time, money and effort and suffered severe emotional distress in 
mounting her defense. Certainly the rule will intimidate those with politically incorrect opinions 
who are unwilling to endure persecution. 
Similarly, consider the charge of racism leveled against Justice Antonin Scalia’s 
comments about mismatch theory during oral arguments in Fisher v. University of Texas, 
Austin.71 What if a speaker refers to a person with gender dysphoria using pronouns according to 
the person’s biological sex rather than the person’s gender identity? Even a law firm that allows 
its bathrooms to be used according to whether one identifies as male or female may not satisfy 
the rule because some people identify as “non-binary.”72 Firms may be required to have a 
bathroom available to anyone. On the other hand, firms that allow (biological) men to use 
women’s bathrooms might be sued under state laws for sexual harassment. 
The inclusion of “socioeconomic status” in the rule is also troubling. What does it even 
mean?73 Are white people in Appalachia a socioeconomic group for purposes of the rule? Since 
partners of a general partnership are jointly and severally liable personally for the debts of the 
firm,74 each partner may be concerned about the financial condition of the others. Under the new 
rule this factor could not be considered in deciding whether to admit or remove someone as a 
                                                 
70 See supra note 28 and accompanying text. 
71 See http://abovethelaw.com/2015/12/scientists-agree-justice-scalia-is-a-racist-idiot/ 
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/was_scalias_comment_racist_some_contend_blacks_may_do_be
tter_at_slower_trac/ http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/dec/10/antonin-scalia-accused-
ofembracing-racist-ideas-f/ http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-scalia-race-20151210- story.html 
http://www.politico.com/story/2015/12/nancy-pelosi-antonin-scalia-216680. See also Blackman, supra 
note 19, at x. 
72 See Liam Stack, Transgender on Tinder?: Now You Can Identify Yourself That Way, Nov. 15, 2016 
(stating that Tinder now allows users to choose from nearly forty gender identity options). 
73 Professor Volokh notes that courts have used the definition of the term in the Sentencing Guidelines: 
“an individual’s status in society as determined by subjective criteria such as education, income, and 
employment.” Eugene Volokh, A Speech Code for Lawyers, Banning Viewpoints That Express “Bias,” 
Including in Law-Related Social Activities, The Volokh Conspiracy, WASH. POST, Aug. 10, 2016, 
available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2016/08/10/a-speech-code-
for-lawyers-banning-viewpoints-that-express-bias-including-in-law-related-social-activities-
2/?utm_term=.ce25a5bb8365. 
74 See Rev. Unif. Partnership Act § 306(a) (1997). 
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partner. Derogatory comments about rich or poor people in conduct related to the law would also 
violate the rule. 
Consider also the Boycott, Divestment, Sanctions (“BDS”) movement against Israel.75 
Critics consider the movement anti-Semitic.76 Supporters disagree.77 This is not a question of 
taste; either the BDS movement is anti-Semitic or it is not. The First Amendment generally 
prevents government from punishing those it considers wrong or unreasonable in such 
controversies. Under Rule 8.4(g), however, biased speech is professional misconduct. Suppose 
that two lawyers participate in a debate over the BDS movement and whether to impose legal 
sanctions on Israel (so that the debate is “related to the practice of law”). The lawyer supporting 
BDS could be accused of bias (anti-Semitism) violating the rule; and the other lawyer could be 
accused of bias toward Arabs, Palestinians, and Muslims. A disciplinary tribunal would have to 
decide if either lawyer manifested bias. That prospect could certainly deter lawyers from 
participating in such an event. 
What of the claim that Jews are God’s chosen people? Some consider this claim bias. 
Bernard-Henri Lévy says that the concept of “election” of the Jews is a “scandalous, almost 
scabrous word.”78 If the claims that Jews are God’s chosen people are acceptable, what of claims 
of white supremacy? The prohibition of “bias or prejudice” is especially problematic as to 
religion in general. The other categories listed in the rule are at least arguably, to some extent, 
matters of a person’s status. Religion is a matter of belief. Many atheists believe that all religion 
is superstition--i.e., unreasoned---so that all claims of religious belief are bias. 
Suppose an atheist lawyer charges that an expression of faith at a continuing legal 
education session organized by the Christian Legal Society violates Rule 8.4(g) because there is 
no God. The Christian lawyer countercharges that the atheist’s complaint manifests bias on the 
basis of religion. Under the First Amendment courts refuse to entertain either charge. Under Rule 
8.4(g) a disciplinary committee does not have that luxury. If a trier is agnostic and believes that 
the existence of God can neither be confirmed nor refuted, she would have to find that both 
lawyers have made unreasoned statements and violated the rule. 
What if a lawyer advocating revival of criminal sodomy laws says that homosexual 
behavior is a mortal sin that, if not repented of, will deprive one of eternal salvation? This 
statement of religious belief violates the rule and the lawyer must be punished unless the tribunal 
finds that the statement is reasonable and therefore not biased. 
                                                 
75 See https://bdsmovement.net. 
76 See Abraham H. Foxman, An Open Letter on Academic Freedom and University Responsibility, Feb. 
8, 2013, available at http://www.adl.org/assets/pdf/press-center/NYT-Ad.pdf (“The BDS movement at its 
very core is anti-Semitic.”). 
77 The website of the BDS movement says “the BDS movement . . . opposes as a matter of principle all 
forms of racism, including Islamophobia and anti-semitism.” See https://bdsmovement.net/faqs. 
78 BERNARD-HENRI LÉVY, THE GENIUS OF JUDAISM X (2016). 
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The experience under prior state rules is bad enough. In In re McCarthy a lawyer, 
responded to a demand from opposing counsel that he arrange a meeting of all the parties in a 
dispute with an email message saying: “I’m not your nigger.”79 The epithet referred to the 
speaker, and the recipient was not a person of color and not a client or subordinate of the 
speaker. There was no employment harassment, no discrimination, and no impairment of 
anyone’s rights in the justice system. The word might be considered obscene, but it wasn’t an 
expression of hate. The email message was not publicized by McCarthy, so it could not be said 
to have “undermine[d] confidence in the legal profession and the legal system.”80 
Was the epithet categorically unacceptable? Suppose on a Friday afternoon a black junior 
partner is about to leave her office for a long-awaited weekend trip with her family. The white 
managing partner enters and informs her that an emergency has arisen and she has to work on it 
through the weekend. Upset, she replies: “I’m not your nigger.” I cannot imagine that she would 
be disciplined at all, much less suspended from practice.81 McCarthy’s fault was not that he said 
the wrong thing but that he was the wrong color. What might be acceptable from others was 
forbidden for him. That this rule can easily be applied discriminatorily is problematic. The 
Supreme Court in Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada stressed that the First Amendment requires 
skepticism about speech restrictions that invite “discriminatory enforcement.”82 
Taken alone, the sanction against McCarthy might be defended on the ground that his 
statement had no political significance or First Amendment value.83 He could have made his 
point by saying “I’m not your errand boy.” In other contexts, though, the offending word does 
have First Amendment value. It is used incessantly in hip-hop music. To punish McCarthy but 
not rappers requires fine distinctions based on context. This is just the kind of “discriminatory 
enforcement” that should be avoided. 
McCarthy also shows the possibility that Rule 8.4(g) will be wielded opportunistically as 
a weapon against adversaries. Perhaps the recipient of McCarthy’s email was sincerely offended, 
but the contentious nature of the exchange raises the possibility that the recipient simply saw an 
opening to injure a difficult opponent. The filing of a formal charge of professional misconduct 
puts a lawyer under a cloud, at least until the complaint is dismissed. Certainly the remarkable 
breadth of Rule 8.4(g) invites such abuses. 
                                                 
79 In re McCarthy, 938 N.E.2d 698, 698 (Ind. 2010). 
80 MODEL RULES PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8, cmt. 3 (2016). 
81 Gillers tacitly agrees. He notes that McCarthy “did not apply the word ‘nigger’ to describe himself as 
an African-American.” Gillers, supra note 7, at [29]. The implication is that the result would have been 
different if McCarthy had been African-American. 
82 501 U.S. 1030, 10xx (1991). See infra note 157 and accompanying text. 
83 The First Amendment provides less or no protection to certain categories of “low- value” speech. See 
infra note 145 and accompanying text. 
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This does not mean that discriminatory remarks never warrant lawyer discipline. In 
Principe v. Assay Partners84 a lawyer made demeaning remarks to a woman attorney during a 
deposition, including calling her “little lady,” “little mouse,” “young girl,” and “little girl” and 
making rude hand gestures in front of other counsel, the witness, and a court reporter. In this case 
there clearly was both harm inflicted on a person during the practice of law and prejudice to the 
administration of justice.  
By contrast, the court in United States v. Wunsch found “a single incident involving an 
isolated expression of a privately communicated bias with no facts that would show how that 
communication adversely affected the administration of justice.”85 Since the rule in question 
forbade only conduct that “interferes with the administration of justice,” the court overturned the 
sanction that had been imposed.86 Perhaps a sanction could have been upheld if the rule had also 
forbidden abusive conduct that meets that “severe or pervasive” standard for harassment.87 
However, Rule 8.4(g) contains no such language that might save it from unconstitutional 
overbreadth and vagueness. 
Rule 8.4(g) prohibits not just speech but any conduct that manifests bias or prejudice. 
Consider the case of Brendan Eich, who was forced out as CEO of Mozilla because he had 
contributed $1,000 to the campaign for California’s Proposition 8, which limited marriage to one 
man and one woman.88 This case did not involve the practice of law, but what if a law firm 
contributed to a similar campaign? To supporters of the gay movement, that would certainly be 
“conduct that manifests bias or prejudice” and, for that reason, not “legitimate” advocacy. A 
contribution made by a law firm would be “conduct related to the practice of law.” 
I hope that courts would find application of Rule 8.4(g) in such a case to be a flagrant 
violation of the First Amendment. Those who want the rule to achieve a “cultural shift” and to 
“tell[. . .] the public who we are” will disagree.89 
 D. “Discrimination on the Basis of . . .” 
Rule 8.4(g) is selective. It is not enough to show that a lawyer has manifested 
discrimination, harassment, bias, or prejudice; one must also show an improper basis for this 
conduct. Because the rule covers hitherto unregulated conduct, it raises the question of what 
constitutes “discrimination” or proof of discrimination. In particular, it raises the question 
whether an improper motive must be shown, or whether conduct that has a disparate impact on a 
                                                 
84 154 Misc.2d 702, 586 N.Y.S.2d 182 (N.Y. Sup.Ct. 1992). 
85 84 F.3d at 111x. The facts of the case are discussed infra notes 235-37 and accompanying text. 
86 Local Civ. R. Prac., U.S. Dist Ct., C.D. Calif. 2.5.2. 
87 See supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text. 
88 See Mozilla’s Chief Felled by View on Gay Unions, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3, 2014, available at 
https://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/04/03/eich-steps-down-as-mozilla-chief/?_r=0. 
89 See supra notes 28-30 and accompanying text. 
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listed class violates the rule regardless of the actor’s motive.90 The “basis” requirement makes 
the scope of the rule even more mysterious and even more subject to political abuse.  
Of course, proof of discriminatory motive is a common problem in anti-discrimination 
laws.91 However, the problem is much greater here—and much more troubling—because the rule 
covers not only acts causing harm in employment, or housing, or the like, but extends to speech 
that causes no more harm than to be disagreeable to someone who hears or learns of it. Former 
Comment 3 to Rule 8.4(d) also prohibited discrimination, but Rule 8.4 applied only to “conduct 
that is prejudicial to the administration of justice.” Questions of discrimination rarely occur in 
that context, as evidenced by the paucity of state cases alleging discrimination.92 
The problem is not chimerical. One lawyer was disciplined for criticizing opposing 
counsel’s pronunciation of the words “establish” and “especially.”93 The court imposed sanctions 
despite uncertainty about the lawyer’s motive.94 Although this case just involved rude behavior, 
discriminatory motive is often an issue in matters of public debate. For example, Baronelle 
Stutzman’s florist shop had for years cordially served Robert Ingersoll and Curt Freed, a gay 
couple. However, when they asked her to design flower arrangements for their wedding, she 
declined because of her religious beliefs.95  
Stutzman argued that she did not discriminate “on the basis of” sexual orientation, as 
evidenced by her long service to the couple. The wedding was different because it required her 
active participation in a ceremony (including custom design work of floral arrangements, 
delivery to the forum, staying at the ceremony to touch up arrangements, and assisting the 
wedding party)96 rather than merely filling an order, and that this participation would make her 
complicit in the same-sex wedding rather than simply tolerating it. Her refusal did not involve 
the couple’s sexual orientation, or even its sexual behavior; she would not assist a wedding 
between people of the same sex (as a florist or otherwise) even if they were not in a sexual 
relationship. Nonetheless, the court found Baronelle Stutzman guilty of discrimination on the 
                                                 
90 See infra notes 106-11 and accompanying text. 
91 See I MERRICK T. ROSSEIN, EMPL. DISCRIM. L. & LITIG. § 2.43 (2017) (discussing complications of 
proof of various kinds of employment discrimination cases). 
92 In Nathanson v. MCAD, WL 199901657 (Ma. 2003) a lawyer was disciplined because she would 
represent women only in divorce cases. With this arguable exception, no precedent cited by Gillers, supra 
note 7, involved discrimination prejudicial to the administration of justice. 
93 In re Monaghan, 743 N.Y.S.2d 519, 520 (1st Dep’t 2002). 
94 The court rejected the finding of a Special Referee that the lawyer’s conduct was “substantially more 
likely to have been gender-related rather than race-related.” Id. at x. However, the court cited no basis for 
either inference as opposed, say, to the possibility that the lawyer was obnoxious to everyone—which 
apparently is not a basis for professional discipline. 
95 See State v. Arlene’s Flowers, Inc., x P.3d x (Wash. Feb. 16, 2017). 
96 See Judge: Arlene’s Flowers Owner Can Be Sued in Her Personal Capacity, Tri-State Herald. January 
7, 2015;  "Wash. floral artist's home, savings at risk of state seizure after court ruling," Alliance 
Defending Freedom, Feb. 18, 2015. 
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basis of sexual orientation.97 Several other courts have reached similar results under similar 
facts.98 The Supreme Court has agreed to review one such case.99 
Such cases may proliferate because of the radical extension of the ban under the new rule. 
Could lawyers be sanctioned for organizing a Federalist Society discussion that does not have 
enough members of a protected group, or advocates for a protected group? The ABA insists on 
certain standards of diversity of race and sex on law faculties.100 Comment 3 to Rule 8.4 
provides: “The substantive law of antidiscrimination and anti-harassment statutes and case law 
may guide application of paragraph (g).”101 However, the law is unclear whether a disparate 
impact proves discrimination. Moreover, the Comment shows that interpretation of the rule is not 
necessarily bound by antidiscrimination law. Not only the organizers but all attendees might be 
charged with a violation since their attendance would certainly be “conduct related to the 
practice of law.” Similarly, opposition to abortion is often characterized as discrimination against 
women and might be claimed to violate the rule.102 
The mandate of Rule 8.4(g) can also clash with Model Rule 2.1, which provides: “In 
rendering advice, a lawyer may refer not only to law but to other considerations such as moral, 
economic, social and political factors, that may be relevant to the client's situation.”103 As a 
comment to Rule 2 notes, “moral and ethical considerations impinge upon most legal questions 
and may decisively influence how the law will be applied.”104 Many common moral precepts 
concern marital status, sexual orientation, gender expression, and socioeconomic status and 
behavior and could be deemed inconsistent with Rule 8.4(g)’s ban on bias or prejudice with 
respect to these factors. Perhaps the proviso for “legitimate advice or advocacy” subordinates 
8.4(g) to 2.1, but the scope of that proviso is not at all clear.105 
                                                 
97 State v. Arlene’s Flowers, Inc., x P.3d x (Wash. Feb. 16, 2017). 
98 See, e.g., Elane Photography v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53 (N.M. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1787 
(2014); Odgaard v. Iowa [get cite]; George Rede, Sweet Cakes Owners Pay Damages While Continuing 
Appeal of $135,000 Bias Case, THE OREGONIAN, Dec. 28, 2015, at 
http://www.oregonlive.com/business/index.ssf/2015/12/sweet_cakes_owners_pay_damages.html. 
99 Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Comm’n, No. 16-111. 
100 American Bar Ass’n, Standards and Rules of Procedure for Approval of Law Schools 2016-2017, 
Standard 206(b) (“a law school shall demonstrate by concrete action a commitment to diversity and 
inclusion by having a faculty and staff that are diverse with respect to gender, race, and ethnicity.”). 
101 Emphasis added. 
102 See Twiss Butler, Abortion Law: “Unique Problem for Women” Or Sex Discrimination, 4 YALE J.L. 
& FEMINISM 133, 145 (1991) (stating that “laws that treat abortion differently from other standard 
medical procedures [are] sex discrimination . . . .”). 
103 MODEL RULES PROF’L CONDUCT R. 2.1. 
104 MODEL RULES PROF’L CONDUCT R. 2, cmt. 2. 
105 See infra notes 276-84 and accompanying text. 
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The meaning of “discrimination” in Rule 8.4(g) is also problematic in categories (such as 
sexual orientation) that get no special treatment under the law of many states or (as in the case of 
socioeconomic status) in any state. For example, most students at prestigious universities come 
from wealthy families.106 Does a law firm violate Rule 8.4(g) if it hires most of its associates 
from the top law schools?107 Does a firm violate the rule if its use of traditional hiring criteria 
results in its having a percentage of minority (which minority?) lawyers that is lower than the 
percentage of that minority in some (which?) geographical area?108 In such a case political 
activists could file complaints against the firm. A disciplinary committee using disparate impact 
analysis could find the firm guilty of discrimination and impose hiring quotas similar to those 
that have been imposed on some police and fire departments.109 
A law firm could violate the rule if it does not retain a sufficient number of contractors 
from a protected group. Some states forbid employers to inquire about the criminal records of job 
applicants,110 in part because such inquiries have a racially disparate impact. Does Rule 8.4(g) 
prohibit such inquiries even in states that do not forbid them? 
Could a progressive or minority lawyers’ group be charged with violating the rule if its 
programs included too few white males? No, because Comment 4 says: “Lawyers may engage in 
conduct undertaken to promote diversity and inclusion without violating the Rule . . . .”111 Could 
the Federalist Society plead this proviso as a defense? Presumably not. The rule lists several 
protected categories, but viewpoint is not one of them, so evidently the diversity that may be 
promoted is not viewpoint diversity. 
E. “Manifest:” Secondary Participants 
                                                 
106 See Amanda Cox et al., A Bigger Affluence Gap Than Expected at Elite Colleges, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19, 
2017, at A3 (reporting study of 38 elite colleges that found that “more students came from the top 1 
percent of the income scale than from the entire bottom 60 percent”). 
107 One supporter of 8.4(g) acknowledged that the permissibility of this practice under the rule may not be 
clear. See A Speech Code for Lawyers, 101 JUDICATURE 70, 73 (2017) (comments of Keith Swisher) 
[hereinafter “Speech Code”]. 
108 It is unclear what minorities might be deemed to count (whites from Appalachia?) for purposes of the 
prohibition against discrimination or how the geographical baseline would be determined for each law 
firm. 
109 See Bratton v. City of Detroit, 712 F.2d 222 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S.Ct. 703 (1984) 
(upholding 50-50 quota for hiring of blacks and non-blacks for Detroit police force). Courts have also 
upheld hiring quotas adopted in consent decrees. See Cleveland Firefighters for Fair Hiring Practices v. 
City of Cleveland, 669 F.3d 737 (6th Cir. 2012) (overturning district court’s termination of a consent 
decree in effect for thirty years requiring that one out of every three new firefighters hired by the city be 
non-Caucasian). 
110 See M. Rodriguez & B. Avery, Ban The Box: U.S. Cities, Counties, and States Adopt Fair-Chance 
Policies to Advance Employment Opportunities for People with Past Convictions, Apr., 2016, National 
Employment Law Project Guide, at  http://www.nelp.org/publication/ban-the-box-fair-chance-hiring-
state-and-local-guide (stating that 23 states and more than 100 jurisdictions have passed such laws).. 
111 MODEL RULES PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8, cmt. 4 (2016). 
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A person who participates in the commission of a tort, including an act of employment 
discrimination or sexual harassment, can be liable with the primary actor.112 Accordingly, it is 
not unusual or problematic that a lawyer who participates in or aids conduct that interferes with 
the administration of justice can be disciplined together with the primary violator. With the 
extension of Rule 8.4(g) to conduct “related to the practice of law,” however, difficult questions 
arise about the degree to which the term “conduct that manifests bias or prejudice”113 applies to 
secondary participants. 
As noted, the new rule applies to activities like CLE programs, law-related protest 
demonstrations and rallies, and social events with clients.114 A lawyer who entertains a client at a 
club or restaurant that requires use of its bathrooms according to one’s biological sex might be 
charged with “conduct that manifests bias or prejudice.” A lawyer who simply attends a protest 
demonstration probably cannot be considered engaged in “conduct related to the practice of 
law.” However, a lawyer listed as a supporter or organizer of an Occupy Wall Street 
demonstration, for example, might be charged with “conduct that manifests bias or prejudice” if 
he “knows or reasonably should know”115 that the demonstration will include biased statements 
against the wealthy. This is core speech protected by the First Amendment.116 
F. Does the Rule Require Proof of Harm? 
Rule 8.4(g) does not require proof of prejudice to the administration of justice. Does it 
require any kind of harm and, if so, does the requirement salvage the constitutionality of the 
rule? The rule itself does not mention harm. Comment 3 says that “discrimination includes 
harmful verbal or physical conduct,”117 which suggests that it does not require harm. 
Even if some harm is required, the comments do not indicate what kind of harm qualifies. 
Professor Gillers opines: “Harmfulness does remain a consideration for valuating whether the 
rule was violated but it includes harm to the justice system, not necessarily personal harm to the 
target.”118 Similarly, Comment 3 says that the rule is intended to prevent activities that 
“undermine confidence in the legal profession and the legal system.”119 What does that mean? If 
                                                 
112 See MARSHALL S. SHAPO, PRINCIPLES OF TORT LAW § 50.02(b), at 329 (3d ed. 2010) (stating that 
those who “act in concert” with or render “substantial assistance or encouragement to” the primary 
tortfeasor may also be held liable). 
113 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8, cmt. 3 (2016). 
114 See supra notes 45-49 and accompanying text. 
115 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.4(g) (2016). 
116 Even Professor Haupt, who generally defends the constitutionality of the rule, finds its application to 
social events to be “on constitutionally weak footing.” Claudia E. Haupt, Antidiscrimination in the Legal 
Profession and the First Amendment: A Partial Defense of Model Rule 8.4(g), 19 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 
ONLINE x, [20] (2017). 
117 MODEL RULES PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8, cmt. 3 (2016) (emphasis added). 
118 Gillers, supra note 7, at [31]. 
119 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8, cmt. 3 (2016). 
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specific proof of such an effect is required, how could it be shown that a given statement had 
“undermine[d] confidence in the legal profession [or] the legal system”? “Confidence” of whom? 
A majority of those asked in a poll? The claim of a single individual that her own confidence was 
undermined? More likely, however, the comment and Professor Gillers’ statement suggest a 
conclusive presumption that statements manifesting bias or prejudice cause such harm; no 
specific proof is necessary, and the defendant cannot try to refute the presumption of harm. 
As the case of Brendan Eich shows,120 political activists may hunt for behavior they 
dislike and seek to punish the actor.121 These people will treat lawyers as they treated Brendan 
Eich. Under Rule 8.4(g), disciplinary committees must review these political grievances. Even if 
a committee is properly sensitive to the First Amendment and ultimately dismisses a complaint, 
the prospect of facing a disciplinary proceeding will deter lawyers from conduct that might 
provoke political agitators. And, of course, there is no guarantee that disciplinary committees 
will be sensitive to the First Amendment. 
Gillers lists some examples that he says would not violate the rule, but these are so 
innocuous as to give little reassurance about the scope of the rule.122 He also cites Faragher v. 
City of Boca Raton,123 where the Supreme Court suggested that a statement would not constitute 
sexual harassment under Title VII if it were “a mere offensive utterance” or an “isolated incident 
. . . (unless extremely serious).”124 The Court added that “to be actionable under the statute, a 
sexually objectionable environment must be both objectively and subjectively offensive, one that 
a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive, and one that the victim in fact did perceive to 
be so.”125 
Title VII covers only employment discrimination; its scope is much narrower than Rule 
8.4(g), which covers any “conduct related to the practice of law.” First Amendment concerns are 
also narrower in the Title VII context. In particular, the potential victims are a “captive 
audience.”126 Rule 8.4(g) is not so limited. 
Moreover, nothing in 8.4(g) or the comments invokes the Faragher standard. The ABA 
specifically rejected a proposal to “include a statement that the Rule be interpreted and 
implemented in accordance with Title VII case law.”127 The McCarthy case shows that in some 
                                                 
120 See supra note 88 and accompanying text. 
121 This has also happened to florists, bakers, and others. See supra notes 95-99 and accompanying text.  
122 Gillers, supra note 7, at [31]. 
123 524 U.S. 775 (1998), cited in Gillers, supra note 7, at [31]. 
124 Id. at 787-88.  
125 Id. 
126 See Jack M. Balkin, Free Speech and Hostile Environments, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 2295, 2307 (1999) ; 
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Sexual Harassment, Content Neutrality, and the Dog That Didn’t Bark, 1994 SUP. 
CT. REV. 1, 43. 
127 Report of the Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility 21 (Aug. 2016). 
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states a lawyer can already be suspended for “a mere offensive utterance,” an ”isolated incident” 
that was not “extremely serious.”128 
Professor Gillers objects to requiring proof of harm to a particular person because that 
would require the complainants to profess their own weakness, to testify that “they were unable 
‘to take’” a biased comment.129 Under the Faragher standard this is not much of a problem 
because the conduct in question “must be both objectively and subjectively offensive, one that a 
reasonable person would find hostile or abusive, and one that the victim did perceive to be so.”130 
Since the conduct must be of a kind “that a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive,” a 
complainant need not claim to be unusually sensitive. Indeed, under Faragher there is no point 
in claiming to be unusually sensitive since conduct is not actionable unless it is objectively 
offensive; i.e., offensive to a reasonable person.  
Moreover, under Faragher a complainant need not claim that she could not “take” a 
biased comment if that means she was rendered incapable of continuing what she was doing. She 
can satisfy Faragher by, for example, testifying that “I did find these comments hostile and 
abusive, although I’m resilient and managed to press on with renewed determination.” 
Again, Professor Gillers says that 8.4(g) bars acts that cause “harm to the justice system,” 
meaning comments that “create the impression that the rule of law can be distorted by name 
calling grounded in identity.”131 That reading of the rule raises the question of the meaning of 
“identity.” Is it invoked by a derogatory comment about the “religious right”? More important, 
when do the words of a lawyer “create the impression that the rule of law can be distorted.” That 
might be understood as meaning “prejudicial to the administration of justice.” However, the rule 
clearly is not so limited. When would a statement in a CLE program or at lunch with a client 
create such an impression? In In re McCarthy132 the lawyer’s statement “I’m not your nigger” 
was in an email sent to one person with an adversary law firm. It could hardly have “create[d] 
the impression that the rule of law can be distorted.” Nonetheless, McCarthy was suspended.  
What if McCarthy had used an equally offensive non-racial term? In one other case, a 
lawyer sent opposing counsel an email message saying, inter alia, “You’re an asshole;” “If you 
try any shit with the court, I welcome it;” and “Don’t fuck me.”133 The court issued a warning to 
the lawyer, but imposed no sanctions. The disparate results can be explained only by the same 
kind of political correctness that underlies the adoption of 8.4(g)—that is, the determination to 
                                                 
128 See supra notes 79-83 and accompanying text. 
129 Gillers, supra note 7, at [30]. 
130 524 U.S. at 787-88. 
131 Gillers, supra note 7, at [30-31] 
132 See supra notes 79-83 and accompanying text. 
133 Alexander Interactive v. Adorama, 12 Civ. 6608 (S.D.N.Y. June 26, 2014), N.Y.L.J., July 3, 2014, at 
http://www.newyorklawjournal.com/id=1202661703410. 
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impose a “cultural shift”134 and to tell “the public who we are.”135 Although citizens are free to 
promote such goals, it is not the province of the bar to impose such rules on the entire profession. 
G. The Range of Potential Complainants 
In general, there is no standing requirement to file an ethics complaint against a lawyer; 
anyone may do so.136 However, the old model rule required “prejudice to the administration of 
justice.”137 By contrast, Rule 8.4(g) applies to any “conduct related to the practice of law” and is 
intended to prevent activities that “undermine confidence in the legal profession and the legal 
system.”138 Apparently, anyone who hears or learns of a presentation by a lawyer about the law 
or of a comment made by a lawyer in a courthouse or law office or to a client may file a 
complaint under Rule 8.4(g). A similar situation exists at the many colleges and universities that 
have established Bias Reporting Systems to receive and process allegations of bias.139 Most of 
these systems allow the accuser to remain anonymous, ostensibly to shield the accuser from 
retaliation.140 Nothing in Rule 8.4(g) suggests that anonymous reporting would be inappropriate.  
Groups will form to ferret out and file complaints about politically incorrect statements. 
They will, for example, monitor Federalist Society and Catholic Bar Association programs and 
scan law review articles and institute charges against anyone who speaks against legal 
recognition of same-sex marriage, racial preferences, or men in women’s bathrooms. They will 
also conduct sting operations. Groups have hunted for bakers, florists, and other service 
providers who decline on religious grounds to assist same-sex weddings.141 They uncovered the 
names of and attacked those who contributed to the campaign for California’s Proposition 8, 
including forcing out Brendan Eich as CEO of Mozilla.142 Similar groups could, for example, 
contact law firm employees seeking evidence of violations of the rule by lawyers.  
Nothing in the old rule precluded such activity, but the limitation of the old rule to 
conduct prejudicial to justice meant that violations were not very common and that only people 
                                                 
134 See supra note 28 and accompanying text. 
135 See supra note 30 and accompanying text. 
136 For example, Ohio allows anyone to file an ethics complaint; the complainant need not allege any 
harm from the alleged violation or even contact with the lawyer. See Ohio State Bar Ass’n, How to File a 
Complaint, at https://www.ohiobar.org/ForPublic/AboutLawyers/Pages/StaticPage-84.aspx. 
137 See supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
138 MODEL RULES PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8, cmt. 3 (2016). 
139 “During the course of 2016, at least 231 Bias Response Teams were reported on American university 
of college campuses.” FIRE Bias Response Report, supra note 59. 
140 See id. (“At a conservative estimate, at least 2.84 million American students are subject to often-
anonymous reporting systems monitored by administrators and police officers.”) (footnotes omitted). 
141 See supra notes 79-83 and accompanying text. 
142 See supra note 88 and accompanying text. 
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involved in judicial proceedings would know about the conduct. The new rule opens unlimited 
opportunities to politically partisan interlopers. 
The new rule is also an inviting weapon against adversaries in litigation. One party can 
file a complaint against another with almost no cost and without having to show any tangible 
harm. Given the rule’s extreme breadth and vagueness, it will be hard to get a complaint 
summarily dismissed. The threat of the cost, distraction, and negative publicity from a prolonged 
disciplinary proceeding may pressure a lawyer in litigation to cave in or to pull punches, even if 
the lawyer is confident that ultimately no violation would be found.  
 
IV. First Amendment Issues  
 A. Content Regulation, Overbreadth, and Vagueness 
The First Amendment forbids laws “abridging the freedom of speech.”143 A government 
action that “imposes content-based restrictions on speech . . . can stand only if they survive strict 
scrutiny, ‘which requires the Government to prove that the restriction furthers a compelling 
interest and is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.’”144  
The Supreme Court has narrowly defined what constitutes a “compelling interest.” It has 
delineated certain kinds of “low-value” speech, such as obscenity, defamation, and fighting 
words, that may be restricted because of their content.145 However, government may not bar 
speech simply because it is “offensive” because that concept is “inherently boundless” and “one 
man’s vulgarity is another man’s lyric.”146 “[W]e cannot indulge the facile assumption that one 
can forbid particular words without also running a substantial risk of suppressing ideas in the 
process. Indeed, governments might soon seize upon the censorship of particular words as a 
convenient guise for banning the expression of unpopular views.”147 A person may even 
advocate criminal conduct “except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing 
imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action.”148 
                                                 
143 U.S. Const., amd. I. 
144 Reed v. Town of Gilbert, x S. Ct. x, x, slip. op. at 14 (2015), quoting Arizona Free Enterprise Club’s 
Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 564 U.S. x, x (2011) (slip op., at 8), quoting Citizens United v. Federal 
Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 340 (2010). 
145 R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 3xx (1992). 
146 Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25 (1971). 
147 Id. at 26. For other Supreme Court cases holding that the state cannot forbid speech merely because it 
is vulgar and offensive, see Lewis v. New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130 (1974); Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 
518 (1972). 
148 Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 108 (1973) (per curiam) (emphasis in original), quoting Brandenburg v. 
Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969). 
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Rule 8.4(g) imposes content-based restraints; it bars certain speech “on the basis of race, 
sex, religion” etc. Accordingly, it can survive only if it “furthers a compelling interest and is narrowly 
tailored to achieve that interest.”149 
The First Amendment also forbids vague restrictions on speech “because persons whose 
expression is constitutionally protected may well refrain from exercising their rights for fear of 
criminal sanctions provided by a statute susceptible of application to protected expression.”150 
“Because First Amendment freedoms need breathing space to survive, government may regulate 
in the area only with narrow specificity.”151 A law is unconstitutionally vague if persons of 
“common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.”152 If 
a law is ambiguous, the Court “will not presume that [it] curtails constitutional activity as little as 
possible. For standards of permissible statutory vagueness are strict in the area of free 
expression.”153 Further, “it matters not that the words [defendant] used might have been 
constitutionally prohibited under a narrowly and precisely drawn statute.”154 If the scope of a 
speech restriction cannot be determined with reasonable certainty, or if it extends to protected as 
well as unprotected speech, it will be stuck down.155 
In a vagueness challenge “perhaps the most important factor affecting the clarity that the 
Constitution demands of a law is whether it threatens to inhibit the exercise of constitutionally 
protected rights. If, for example, the law interferes with the right of free speech or of association, 
a more stringent vagueness test should apply.” 156 
In Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada the Supreme Court said:  
The prohibition against vague regulations of speech is based in part on the 
need to eliminate the impermissible risk of discriminatory enforcement. . . . for 
history shows that speech is suppressed when either the speaker or the message is 
critical of those who enforce the law. The question is not whether discriminatory 
enforcement occurred here, and we assume it did not, but whether the Rule is so 
imprecise that discriminatory enforcement is a real possibility.157 
 B. Viewpoint Discrimination 
                                                 
149 See supra note 144 and accompanying text. 
150 Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 5xx (1972). 
151 N.A.A.C.P. v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963). 
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The First Amendment standard of review is even stricter if a law forbids not a general 
category of speech but only certain viewpoints. In general, content restraints cover a category of 
speech. They become viewpoint discrimination if they single “out a subset of messages for 
disfavor based on the views expressed.”158 “The government may not regulate use based on 
hostility—or favoritism—towards the underlying message expressed.”159 “The government must 
abstain from regulating speech when the specific motivating ideology or the opinion or 
perspective of the speaker is the rationale for the restriction.”160 “If there is a bedrock principle 
underlying the First Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the expression of an 
idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable.”161 
Just last term the Court decided Matal v. Tam, in which a band was denied a trademark 
for its name, The Slants, under a law barring marks that “may disparage . . . persons, living or 
dead . . . or bring them into contempt, or disrepute.” 162 The name was admittedly a term of racial 
disparagement, a racial epithet. The case also involved commercial speech (to which the Court 
has often granted less protection). Nonetheless, the Court unanimously held the statute invalid on 
its face.163 The Court reiterated its long-standing principle that “Speech may not be banned on 
the ground that it expresses ideas that offend.”164 
Although there is no reason to think that the Court had Rule 8.4(g) in mind when it 
decided Matal, the opinion seems to anticipate that rule. Incorporating Justice Holmes’s famed 
phrase, the Court said: “Speech that demeans on the basis of race, ethnicity, gender, religion, 
age, disability, or any other similar ground is hateful; but the proudest boast of our free speech 
jurisprudence is that we protect the freedom to express ‘the thought that we hate.’”165 
                                                 
158 Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1766 (2017) (Kennedy, J., concurring). The opinion of Justice 
Kennedy was joined by three colleagues. Three other justices joined the opinion of Justice Alito which 
applied less strict scrutiny, but only because they viewed the case as involving commercial speech. See id, 
at 1763. 
159 R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 386 (1992). See also Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 362-63 
(1976). 
160 Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995). 
161 Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989). See also Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443 (2011) 
(forbidding curbs on public speech, even if it is “outrageous,” including a sign saying “God Hates Fags”); 
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992) (striking down law that prohibited “arous[ing] anger, 
alarm, or resentment in others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender”); Brandenburg v. 
Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969). 
162 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) (2017). 
163 Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744 (2017). 
164 Id. at x. 
165 Id. at 1764, quoting United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644, 655 (1929) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
See generally ANTHONY B. LEWIS, FREEDOM FOR THE THOUGHT WE HATE: A BIOGRAPHY OF THE FIRST 
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The Court has also protected derogatory statements about sexual orientation. In Snyder v. 
Phelps166 the family of a Marine killed in Iraq sued for defamation and intentional infliction of 
emotional distress by members of a religious congregation who picketed the soldier’s funeral, 
carrying signs that said, inter alia, “Fag troops,” “Semper fi fags,” and “God Hates Fags.”167 It is 
hard to imagine speech more distressing to someone than this was to the dead soldier’s family. 
Nonetheless, the Court ruled overwhelmingly that such speech is constitutionally protected. 
To survive strict scrutiny the government must demonstrate that there is a compelling 
need for a restriction and that the means chosen are the least restrictive available.168 Although the 
Supreme Court has not categorically prohibited such laws, “the Court has never openly approved 
a government action punishing an individual merely on the basis that the government’s views of 
a particular issue differed from those of the individual.”169 
Some people now believe that the unique harm of “hate speech” warrants an exception 
under the First Amendment.170 This position expressly embraces both viewpoint discrimination 
and identity-group discrimination; members of supposedly oppressed groups are allowed much 
greater freedom to speak than others are, and speech about supposedly oppressed groups is 
rigorously regulated while speech about supposedly dominant groups is not.171 This is ironic; for 
saying that certain minorities are less resilient and less able than others to withstand the rigors of 
free public debate, proponents of this view could be accused of manifesting racial bias in 
violation of the rule. In any case, however, the survey above shows that the Supreme Court has 
not accepted this argument in the least. 
C. Rule 8.4(g) Under the First Amendment 
By virtue of old Comment 3, Rule 8.4(d) already forbade certain verbal conduct.172 
However, that comment referred only to conduct “in the course of representing a client,” and the 
                                                 
166 562 U.S. 443 (2011). 
167 Id. at 448. 
168 See Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 199 (1992). 
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underlying  rule applied only to “conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice.”173 
These limitations removed most First Amendment problems. A law may forbid speech that is 
part of conduct if the law is “directed not against speech but against conduct.”174 Thus, speech 
that is part of “conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice” or occurs while 
“representing a client” may be regulated in ways that other speech cannot be regulated.  
Rule 8.4(g) is problematic because it is not so limited. In R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul175 the 
Supreme Court struck down an ordinance forbidding “fighting words” because it did not forbid 
all “fighting words” but only “’fighting words’ that insult, or provoke violence, ‘on the basis of 
race, color creed, religion, or gender.’”176 If 8.4(g) mandated genteel behavior by lawyers in 
conduct related to the practice of law, or simply forbade any abusive behavior by lawyers, there 
could be an interesting debate about the propriety of such a rule, but that is not what the ABA 
did. Instead, it adopted a rule that, like the ordinance struck down in R.A.V., forbids only certain 
kinds of bias.  
For example, statements vilifying American soldiers or police slain in the course of duty 
do not violate Rule 8.4(g).177 Certainly such behavior is at least as repugnant to the public and at 
least as injurious to the reputation of the profession as the behavior barred by 8.4(g). Nothing in 
the rule or its legislative history explains the restriction to certain viewpoints. Did the new rule 
omit some kinds of bias because lawyers rarely commit them? There is no evidence of that, but 
in any case Professor Gillers has declared the frequency of biased behavior “irrelevant.”178 
An interesting question is suggested by In re Monaghan.179 During a deposition 
Monaghan “engaged in a continuing harangue of Ms. Perry for her alleged mispronunciation of 
the words ‘establish’ and ‘especially.’"180 There was disagreement whether this harangue was 
gender-related rather than race-related.181 In that case it made no difference because both were 
forbidden under the applicable rule.182 However, mockery of a regional (e.g., Brooklyn or 
Southern) accent would not violate rule 8.4(g). Under Rule 8.4(g), then, a disciplinary committee 
                                                 
173 MODEL RULES PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.4(d) (1998). 
174 R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. at 3xx. 
175 505 U.S. 377 (1992). 
176 Id. at 3xx. 
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and accompanying text. 
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180 Id. at x. 
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might have to decide whether an incident of mockery was based on race or gender or 
socioeconomic status, any of which would violate the rule; or on regional or geographic bias, 
which would not be a violation. Again, some viewpoints are permitted, others are forbidden. 
The framing of the protected categories in Rule 8.4(g) is inherently discriminatory. The 
rule forbids not bias on issues relating to those categories, but “on the basis of” those categories. 
Consider a debate about the law as to which public bathroom should be used by people with 
gender dysphoria. One lawyer says people should be required to use public bathrooms according 
to their biological sex. Another lawyer says that people should be allowed to choose a bathroom 
according to their gender identity and that anyone who disagrees is disgusting and should be 
ostracized by decent people and the law should treat such people as murderers. 
The statement by the first speaker manifests “an inclination of temperament or outlook” 
that relates to “gender identity” and violates the rule if the statement is deemed unreasonable. 
The second statement, however, relates to people who hold a particular opinion, not to any group 
protected by the rule. The statement does not violate the rule, no matter how intemperate it may 
be, even if it violated a criminal law forbidding fighting words. The only reason for banning 
certain kinds of speech under 8.4(g) is that such speech is considered politically incorrect. 
Whatever the arguments for banning “hate speech,” Rule 8.4(g) is no such ban. For one 
thing, it includes the category of socioeconomic status, which no one has claimed needs special 
protection. More important, the rule is not limited to “hate speech,” however it might be defined, 
but bars any statement concerning the preferred categories that a disciplinary committee later 
deems unreasonable.183 Some cases decided under existing rules have punished speech that could 
not be characterized as “hate speech.”184 The legislative history and commentary on the rule 
suggest its coverage is broad and is not confined to anything like “hate speech.”185 
The rule also imposes on lawyers a particular viewpoint about the nature of human 
identity. Consider a biological white male who identifies as a black woman. 8.4(g) forbids 
discrimination on the basis of gender identity, so a lawyer violates the rule by calling this person 
a man rather than respecting his/her gender identity as a woman. However, the rule does not 
forbid discrimination based on racial identity, so a lawyer does not violate the rule by calling this 
person white, disregarding his/her racial identity as black. The rule dictates which aspects of 
human identity (like race) lawyers must treat as objective, and which (like gender) they may treat 
as subjective.  
                                                 
183 See supra notes 161-62 and accompanying text. 
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This is precisely what the Supreme Court in R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul said may not be 
done. Under the ordinance in question there  
[o]ne could hold up a sign saying, for example, that all “anti-Catholic bigots” are 
misbegotten; but not that all “papists” are, for that would insult and provoke 
violence “on the basis of religion.” St. Paul has no such authority to license one 
side of a debate to fight freestyle, while requiring the other to follow Marquis of 
Queensbury Rules.186 
Rule 8.4(g) makes the same kind of viewpoint distinctions as the ordinance invalidated in R.A.V. 
Rule 8.4(g) is even perverse in that in some ways it treats mere speech more harshly than 
conduct directly affecting individuals. The rule provides: “This paragraph does not limit the 
ability of a lawyer to accept, decline or withdraw from a representation in accordance with Rule 
1.16.”187 Thus a lawyer who simply refuses to represent members of a covered group may not 
violate the rule.188 However, a lawyer who announces “I will represent everyone equally, 
although I don’t like” a protected group, would violate the rule. Thus, in addition to its other 
flaws, the rule invites dissembling. 
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30 
 
In its politically discriminatory selectivity Rule 8.4(g) resembles the college speech codes 
that are now widespread.189 Like the ABA, colleges claim that they are special communities with 
a compelling need to curb discriminatory, demeaning, intimidating, or hostile speech.190 Not a 
single one of these codes has survived constitutional challenge at a public institution.191  
Any claim that 8.4(g) is intended simply to achieve civility is false, as Professor Charles 
Fried has shown such claims to be for college speech codes: 
The benign claim that the regulations simply seek to produce a more courteous 
community is denied by the fact that not all breaches of courtesy fall under the 
ban . . . .[T]he ban is an exercise of power, it shows who is boss. Thus, the holders 
of noxious ideas are suppressed and the rest of the community is impressed and 
intimidated by this display of political might.192 
In R.A.V. the City of St. Paul asserted that  
a general “fighting words” law would not meet the city’s needs because only a 
content-specific measure can communicate to minority groups that the “group 
hatred” aspect of such speech “is not condoned by the majority.” The point of the 
First Amendment is that majority preferences must be expressed in some fashion 
other than silencing speech on the basis of its content.193 
Because of the politically-motivated selectivity of Rule 8.4(g), it is not enough to show 
that a lawyer has manifested discrimination, harassment, bias, or prejudice. One must also show 
an improper basis for this conduct. In other words, one must show motive. This requirement 
makes the scope of the rule even more mysterious and even more subject to political abuse.194 
An instructive contrast is offered by Section 2.3 of Code of Judicial Conduct, which 
forbids judges “by word or conduct [to] manifest bias or prejudice, or engage in harassment, 
                                                 
189 In 2016 the Foundation for Individual Rights in Education found that nearly half of 440 major colleges 
it surveyed had “at least one policy both clearly and substantially restricting freedom of speech, or that 
bars public access to its speech-related policies by requiring a university login and password for access.” 
Only twenty-two (5%) had “policies [that] do not seriously threaten campus expression,” Fdtn. for Indiv. 
Rights in Educ., Spotlight on Speech Codes: 2016, available at https://www.thefire.org/spotlight-on-
speech-codes-2016. 
190 See, e.g., UWM Post, Inc. v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Wis. System, 774 F. Supp. 1163 (E.D. Wis. 
1991). 
191 See McCauley v. Univ. of the V.I., 618 F.3d 232 (3d Cir. 2010); Coll. Republicans at S.F. State Univ. 
v. Reed, 523 F. Supp. 2d 1005 (N.D. Cal. 2007); UWM Post, Inc. v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Wis. 
System, 774 F. Supp. 1163 (E.D. Wis. 1991); Doe v. Univ. of Michigan, 721 F. Supp. 852 (E.D. Mich. 
1989). 
192 Charles Fried, A New First Amendment Jurisprudence: A Threat to Liberty, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 225, 
246 (1992). 
193 Id. at 3xx. 
194 See supra notes 90-111, 157 and accompanying text. 
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including, but not limited to, bias or prejudice bias based upon race, sex, . . . political 
affiliation.”195 It further provides that its “restrictions . . . do not preclude judges or lawyers from 
making legitimate reference to the listed factors, or similar factors, when they are relevant to an 
issue in a proceeding.”196 
Unlike Rule 8.4(g), Section 2.3 expressly forbids bias, prejudice, or harassment based on 
political affiliation. If the purpose of 8.4(g) is to cultivate civility by making certain conduct 
“unacceptable” and to tell the public “who we are,” why does it omit this factor? The breadth of 
the phrase “including, but not limited to” in Section 2.3 is troubling given the vagueness of the 
concept of bias, but at least that rule is not expressly limited to certain politically correct 
concerns. 
The exception for “conduct undertaken to promote diversity and inclusion”197 in 8.4(g) 
also constitutes viewpoint discrimination. Statements favoring racial preferences for certain 
minorities would be permitted, while statements opposing racial preferences might not be.198 
Further, the rule makes an exception only for certain kinds of diversity and inclusion, although it 
is not entirely clear which those are.199 
Again, Professor Gillers says that “The Rule tells the public who we are.”200 Of course, a 
bar association may proclaim that it dislikes certain kinds of speech. However, it cannot impose 
its dislikes on lawyers through disciplinary rules.  
3. The Potential for Discriminatory Enforcement. It is hard to imagine a greater “risk of 
discriminatory enforcement” than Rule 8.4(g). Its supporters expressly designed it to effect a 
“cultural shift.”201 Its list of protected categories reflects a political agenda that is not shared by 
many people or by the law of many states. It bars discrimination on the basis of non-conforming 
gender behavior, for example, but not on the basis of other kinds of behavior, like smoking, 
gambling, or eating meat. 
Rule 8.4(g) authorizes “conduct undertaken to promote diversity and inclusion” but not 
conduct (including speech) to oppose them. Further, the rule does not say what kind of diversity 
and inclusion is authorized. In universities and other institutions, these terms typically apply to 
some underrepresented groups but not others. For example, there are no diversity programs to 
                                                 
195 CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT § 2.3(B). 
196 Id., § 2.3(D). 
197 MODEL RULES PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8, cmt. [4] (2016). 
198 Consider, e.g., the controversy over Justice Scalia’s comments during oral argument in Fisher v. Univ. 
of Texas, Austin. See supra note 71 and accompanying text. See also Blackman, supra note 19, at x. 
199 See supra note 111 and infra note 202 and accompanying text. 
200 Gillers, supra note 7, at x. 
201 See supra note 28 and accompanying text.  
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promote inclusion of conservative scholars on university faculties.202 Politically “discriminatory 
enforcement” is not just a likely side effect of Rule 8.4(g) but its very purpose. 
Although Rule 8.4(g) was adopted to advance the political agenda of the left, in some 
cases this plan could backfire. The Rules of Professional Conduct are enforced by 51 diverse 
jurisdictions, some of which may not share the leftist agenda and could brandish the rule against 
progressives who make statements that conservatives do not consider well-reasoned. Hate-crime 
laws have often been applied to minorities who committed crimes against whites. The same 
could be true with Rule 8.4(g). Black lawyers are more likely than white lawyers to raise issues 
of race. Statements like “white people don’t understand” something or “whites are not willing to 
come to grips with race” could be deemed statements of bias with respect to race. 
Consider In re Sawyer,203 where lawyers were sanctioned for protesting their clients’ 
prosecution under the Smith Act, which, inter alia, required registration of Communists.204 
Consider also Standing Committee v. Yagman,205where a civil rights lawyer was found to have 
hindered the administration of justice by excessive criticism of a judge whom he called, inter 
alia, “a right-wing fanatic.”206 The federal court of appeals overturned the finding because the 
lawyer’s criticisms were protected by the First Amendment. This case did not involve a category 
protected under Rule 8.4(g), but it shows that the First Amendment is not a refuge for 
conservatives only. 
Rule 8.4(g) could also backfire because it could be used by wealthier parties to harass 
poorer adversaries.207 Consider a sole practitioner who represents tenants in housing disputes. 
Owners who consider this lawyer an annoyance could monitor her behavior, including 
statements at public events where she speaks as a lawyer. If she says “Owners are greedy rich 
people,” she can be charged with bias on the basis of socioeconomic status in violation of the 
rule. Even if she is ultimately exonerated, the cost in time and money of defending herself might 
force her to curb her advocacy. And, of course, she might not be exonerated. 
D. The Special Status of Lawyers and the Case of Rule 8.4(g). Defenders of the rule 
argue that different standards apply to lawyers.208 A government license is required to practice 
                                                 
202 [Cites] 
203 See infra notes 223-27 and accompanying text. 
204 See Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290 (1961); and Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203 (1961), for 
discussions of the content and constitutionality of the Smith Act. 
205 55 F.3d 1430 (9th Cir. 1995). 
206 Id. at 1433-34. See also Mississippi Bar v. Lumumba, 912 So. 2d 871, 8xx (2005), where a lawyer was 
suspended from practice despite the argument in an amicus curiae brief by the (liberal) 
Constitutional for Constitutional Rights that the lawyer’s criticisms of a judge were protected by the First 
Amendment. 
207 See supra notes 136-42 and accompanying text. 
208 See Gillers, supra note 7, at x; Haupt, supra note 116, at x. 
33 
 
law, but the Supreme Court has held that “the Government ‘may not deny a benefit to a person 
on a basis that infringes his constitutionally protected . . . freedom of speech even if he has no 
entitlement to that benefit.’”209 The Court has indicated that in general the state may not 
condition the issuance of licenses on restrictions of the licensee’s freedom of speech.210 Certainly 
the bar may forbid conduct (including speech) that interferes with the administration of justice, 
but there is no authority for it to impose any broader restrictions of speech.211  
Moreover, even rules presented as protecting the administration of justice are not immune 
from First Amendment review. States have long regulated solicitation by attorneys, and still 
do.212 Nonetheless, in NAACP v. Button213 the Court struck down the application of a statute 
forbidding “improper solicitation” by attorneys to prohibit litigation-related speech by the 
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People. The Court said: ”it is no answer to 
the constitutional claims asserted by the petitioner to say . . . that the purpose of these regulations 
was merely to insure high professional standards and not to curtail free expression. For a State 
may not, under the guise of prohibiting professional misconduct, ignore constitutional rights.”214 
A fortiori, Rule 8.4(g), which regulates speech of a kind that has never previously been 
regulated, must be unconstitutional. 
In Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada215 a lawyer was charged with making public statements 
that would prejudice the pending trial of his client. He argued that the applicable term 
“substantial likelihood of material prejudice” was unconstitutionally broad. The majority rejected 
this claim only because the term’s drafters “apparently thought” that this formulation 
“approximated the clear and present danger test.”216 
The Court stressed the special status of a lawyer in litigation: “[T]he speech of lawyers 
representing clients in pending cases may be regulated under a less demanding standard than that 
established for regulation of the press . . . .”217 The Court quoted a prior lawyer discipline case: 
                                                 
209 Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, x (2017) (slip op. at 18) (quoting Agency for Int’l Development v. 
Alliance for Open Society Int’l, Inc., 570 U.S. x (2013) (slip op., at 8) (some internal quotation marks 
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210 Id., slip op., at 20. 
211 See Keiser, supra note 15, at 632-33. 
212 See MODEL RULES PROF’L CONDUCT R. 7.1-7.4 (2017). 
213 371 U.S. 415 (1963). 
214 Id. at 438-39. The justifications offered by the state for the law in Button were not flimsy; they were 
strong enough to persuade three justices to uphold the law. See id. at 448 (Harlan, J., dissenting). See also 
In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978) (holding that solicitation of prospective litigants by a nonprofit 
organization that undertook litigation as a form of political expression and political association 
constituted expressive and associational conduct entitled to First Amendment protection). 
215 501 U.S. 1030, 1031 (1991). 
216 Id. at 10xx. 
217 Id. at 10xx (emphasis added). Four justices concurring in the result were even more emphatic. They 
said that the reach of the bar’s prohibitions must be “nor greater than is necessary or essential to the 
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“[The lawyer] as a citizen could not be denied any of the common rights of citizens. But he stood 
before the inquiry and before the [court] in another quite different capacity, also. As a lawyer he 
was ‘an officer of the court, and, like the court itself, an instrument . . . of justice . . . .”218 
Nonetheless, the Court struck down the sanctions imposed on Gentile because the 
applicable rule was vague. It provided that a lawyer “may state without elaboration . . . the 
general nature of the . . . defense.”219 The Court said the rule ”provides insufficient guidance 
because ‘general’ and ‘elaboration’ are both classic terms of degree. In the context before us, 
these terms have no settled usage or tradition of interpretation in law. The lawyer has no 
principle for determining when his remarks pass from the safe harbor of the general to the 
forbidden sea of the elaborated.”220 
As suggested in Gentile,  a rule vague on its face may be clarified by judicial or 
administrative interpretation, and this has saved some disciplinary rules,221 but not others. The 
term “offensive personality” was long part of the disciplinary code of California and some other 
states and had been applied in many cases, but the court in United States v. Wunsch held it could 
find no “single controlling decision—much less a clear line of authority”--that limited the scope 
of the rule.222 The terms “bias” and “discrimination” for Rule 8.4(g) likewise have no established 
meaning in the law, at least as applied to pure speech. 
In In re Sawyer223 a lawyer was sanctioned for making a public speech which the 
disciplinary body found to have impugned the integrity of a judge. The Supreme Court reversed. 
Justice Brennan said that “lawyers are free to criticize the state of the law.”224 The Bar 
Association argued that Sawyer was subject to a stricter standard than other lawyers because she 
was involved in the case that gave rise to her criticisms.225 The Court rejected that argument: 
                                                 
protection of the particular governmental interest involved.” 501 U.S. at 10xx (Kennedy, J., quoting 
Seattle Times Co. v. Rinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 32 (1984)). 
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“conduct unbecoming a member of the bar” because the phrase “refers to the legal profession ‘code of 
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222 84 F.3d at 111x. 
223 360 U.S. 622 (1959). 
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225 Id. at 635-36. 
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A lawyer does not acquire any license to do these things by not being presently 
engaged in a case. They are equally serious whether he currently is engaged in 
litigation before the judge or not. We can conceive no ground whereby the 
pendency of litigation might be thought to make an attorney's out-of-court 
remarks more censurable, other than that they might tend to obstruct the 
administration of justice.226 
While she could not make statements that impugned the judge, she “remained equally free [with 
lawyers not involved in the case] to make critical statements that did not cross that line.”227 
In In re Snyder228 a lawyer sent a court a letter criticizing its meager pay for lawyers 
representing indigent clients. The court suspended the lawyer, finding that his letter was “totally 
disrespectful to the federal courts and to the judicial system. It demonstrates a total lack of 
respect for the legal process and the courts."229 The Supreme Court reversed unanimously. It 
acknowledged that a lawyer’s license “requires members of the bar to conduct themselves in a 
manner compatible with the role of courts in the administration of Justice”230 and that “petitioner 
concedes that the tone of his letter was "harsh, and, indeed it can be read as ill-mannered.”231 
However, the Court held that “a single incident of rudeness or lack of professional courtesy--in 
this context--does not support a finding of contemptuous or contumacious conduct.”232 
Gentile shows that even rules restricting the speech of lawyers in litigation must be clear 
and precise. Sawyer and Snyder show further that even rules designed to protect the 
administration of justice must be narrow enough to allow criticism, even if it is “harsh” or “ill-
mannered.” 
Ironically, one organization that agrees that “professional speech” is entitled to full First 
Amendment protection is – the American Bar Association! In a 2016 Amicus Curia brief 
supporting doctors challenging a Florida statute that, inter alia, forbade doctors to ask patients 
about guns, the ABA argued: “[T]he Supreme Court has never recognized ‘professional speech’ 
                                                 
226 Id. at 636. 
227 Id. The concurring opinion of Justice Stewart indicates a similar attitude. He said that the sanctions 
imposed on the attorney could stand “if it had been charged or if it had been found that the petitioner 
attempted to obstruct or prejudice the due administration of justice by interfering with a fair trial. . . . . But 
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as a category of lesser protected expression, and has repeatedly admonished that no new such 
classifications be created.”233 The ABA’s position was upheld by a solid majority of the 11th 
Circuit en banc.234 
Lower court decisions on discipline of lawyers for their speech are rare, but do offer 
some additional guidance. In United States v. Wunsch235 the court found that a letter written by a 
lawyer to a female prosecutor “impugns ‘female lawyers’ and reveals a patently sexist 
attitude.”236 However, the court annulled the sanctions imposed because the state law requiring 
lawyers to “abstain from offensive personality” was both unconstitutionally vague and 
unconstitutionally overbroad.237 
Professor Gillers says that “Rule 8.4(g) and its comments are substantially more 
specific”238 than the rule in Wunsch, but the reverse seems true. Even if “bias or prejudice” 
covers only unreasoned opinions, there is wide dispute about what opinions are unreasoned. The 
ABA Report supporting Rule 8.4(g) cites several cases that upheld state disciplinary rules against 
vagueness challenges.239 However, none of these cases involved a term at all similar to the 
phrase “verbal or physical conduct that manifests bias or prejudice towards others” in comment 3 
and none involved conduct outside the practice of law. 
Other factors make Wunsch even more damning to 8.4(g). The lawyer there sent a female 
prosecutor a letter saying: “MALE LAWYERS PLAY BY THE RULES, DISCOVER TRUTH 
AND RESTORE ORDER. FEMALE LAWYERS ARE OUTSIDE THE LAW, CLOUD 
TRUTH AND DESTROY ORDER.”240 The statement was a deliberate insult directed at a 
specific attorney who was involved in a case with the offender, so it clearly involved the practice 
of law, and the abuse of another attorney in litigation could easily be seen as prejudicial to the 
administration of justice. Nonetheless, the court reversed the imposition of sanctions. 
In Standing Committee v. Yagman a lawyer was suspended by the District Court for 
impugning the integrity of a judge and interfering with the administration of justice.241 The Ninth 
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Circuit reversed.242 It stressed that the First Amendment requires speech curbs to be narrowly 
defined. Statements criticizing a judge “may not be punished unless they are capable of being 
proved true or false” and only if they can “reasonably be interpreted as stating actual facts about 
their target.”243 The court held that the statements by Yagman did not satisfy this standard. 
The District Court also found that Yagman had “interfere[d] with the administration of 
justice.”244 Citing Gentile, the Ninth Circuit recognized that “speech otherwise entitled to full 
constitutional protection may nonetheless be sanctioned if it obstructs or prejudices the 
administration of justice.”245 It then said:  
Given the significant burden this rule places on otherwise protected speech, 
however, the Court has held that prejudice to the administration of justice must be 
highly likely before speech may be punished. . . . Statements may be punished 
only if they "constitute an imminent, not merely a likely, threat to the 
administration of justice. The danger must not be remote or even probable; it must 
immediately imperil.246 
Citing Gentile, the court said that a lower standard—“a ‘substantial likelihood’ of 
materially prejudicing the fairness of the proceeding”—applies to lawyers making out-of-court 
statements only in pending cases.247 It continued:  
The special considerations identified by Gentile are of limited concern when no 
case is pending before the court. . . . We conclude, therefore, that lawyers’ 
statements unrelated to a matter pending before the court may be sanctioned only 
if they pose a clear and present danger to the administration of justice.248 
Some courts have adopted a less demanding standard, but only for conduct alleged to prejudice 
the administration of justice.249 
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Rule 8.4(g) does not even pretend to such a rigorous standard. As noted,250 Comment 3 
simply pronounces ex cathedra that actions that violate the rule “undermine confidence in the 
legal profession and the legal system.”251 The rule does not even require an allegation that 
conduct had any impact, much less an “imminent . . . threat” to the administration of justice.252 
Professor Gillers offers two justifications for the rule. First, it “tells the bar as a whole that its 
licensing authority deems the behavior the rule describes as unacceptable.”253 “Second, adoption 
of Rule 8.4(g) tells the public that the legal profession will not tolerate this conduct, not solely 
when aimed at other lawyers, but at anyone. The Rule tells the public who we are.”254 
A bar organization has its own freedom of speech and can take positions, even if they are 
controversial, but it cannot muzzle lawyers. “A law that is content based on its face is subject to 
strict scrutiny regardless of the government’s benign motive, content-neutral justification, or lack 
of ‘animus toward the ideas contained’ in the regulated speech.”255 As the court said in Yagman: 
“Much speech of public importance . . .  would be chilled if the [substantial likelihood of 
material prejudice] rule in Gentile were extended beyond the confines of a pending matter.”256 
8.4(g) is even more problematic since it does not even require proof of a “substantial likelihood 
of material prejudice.” 
Professor Gillers defends the application of Rule 8.4(g) beyond protection of the 
administration of justice: “Why should identical biased words or conduct be forbidden in 
litigation but allowed in all other work lawyers do?”257 Case law gives the answer: Except as 
necessary to protect the administration of justice, lawyers have the same free speech rights as 
anyone else. There is no hint in the cases that the bar may forbid speech simply because it 
believes that it “manifests bias” or will “undermine confidence in the legal profession and the 
legal system,”258 much less that the bar may forbid speech in order to impose a “cultural shift in 
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understanding the inherent integrity of people.”259 A general desire to make lawyers moral does 
not override these principles.260 
The constitutional infirmities of Rule 8.4(g) are deepened by the failure of the ABA to 
point to any existing problems that the rule would solve. In Edenfield v. Fane, for example, the 
Supreme Court struck down an anti-solicitation regulation for CPAs in part because the State 
Board of Accountancy had not presented any “studies that suggest personal solicitation of 
prospective business clients by CPAs creates the dangers . . . that the Board claim[ed] to fear,” 
and had not provided “any anecdotal evidence . . . that validate[d] the Board’s [interests].”261 
The legislative history of Rule 8.4(g) does not supply the specificity that might save it 
from unconstitutional vagueness and overbreadth; on the contrary, it reveals a cavalier disregard 
of the vagueness problem. The words “bias or prejudice” appeared in comment 2 to the old Rule 
8.4.262 The drafters used the words “harassment or discrimination” in new Rule 8.4(g) for the 
sake of specificity, because a considerable body of law under Title VII and other anti-
discrimination statutes and regulations already defines those words.263 The Chair of the 
Committee, Myles Link, rejected an earlier draft, saying that its “‘bias or prejudice’ language is 
‘amorphous’ and ‘squishy.’”264 
However, while the final rule itself bars “harassment or discrimination,” new Comment 3 
says that harassment or discrimination “includes harmful verbal or physical conduct that 
manifests bias or prejudice toward others.” Thus the rule also bars other conduct, but gives no 
hint what that conduct might be. The Comment brings back the very language that Mr. Link 
rejected as “amorphous” and “squishy” and compounds the vagueness by indicating that other—
but unspecified—conduct is also barred. The Comment adds that “The substantive law of 
antidiscrimination and anti-harassment statutes and case law may guide application of paragraph 
(g),”265 rather than saying that they apply to paragraph (g). Thus any precision in the words 
“harassment or discrimination” in the rule itself is destroyed by Comment 3. 
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The comments to the rule also exacerbate its vagueness in other ways. Comment 3 states 
the justification for the rule: “Discrimination and harassment by lawyers in violation of 
paragraph (g) undermine confidence in the legal profession and the legal system.”266 If this 
means that the rule is violated only when specific conduct has such an effect, how could an 
attorney discussing the law know whether she might be accused of “undermin[ing] confidence in 
the legal profession [or] the legal system”? More likely, however, the comment indicates a 
conclusive presumption of harm so that no proof of specific harm is required in individual 
cases.267 This flouts the First Amendment principle that curbs on speech require “narrow 
specificity.”268 
The Ethics Committee said the new rule was intended to impose a “cultural shift in 
understanding the inherent integrity of people.”269 This phrase, too, compounds the vagueness 
problem. What does that phrase mean? When does speech betray a misunderstanding of “the 
integrity of people”?270 The First Amendment does not require citizens to curb their speech lest 
they guess wrong about the meaning of such a cryptic term.271 
The term “harassment” is also troubling. Comment 3 says: “Harassment includes sexual 
harassment and derogatory or demeaning verbal or physical conduct.”272 Thus “harassment” 
clearly is not limited to sexual harassment. The comment also shows that the limitation of sexual 
harassment in federal law to conduct that is “severe or pervasive” 273 does not necessarily apply 
to Rule 8.4(g). When is conduct “derogatory or demeaning” and when is it merely impolite? 
Once again, the rule is hopelessly vague. 
It is also far too broad. It is often a lawyer’s duty to engage in “derogatory or demeaning 
verbal or physical conduct,” as when a lawyer at trial tries to impeach the honesty of an opposing 
witness. Supreme Court justices have often made “derogatory or demeaning” comments in Court 
opinions and elsewhere.274 Debates over legal issues often include “derogatory or demeaning” 
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comments. The Supreme Court has often exonerated speech that clearly was “derogatory or 
demeaning.”275 
The new rule says that it “does not preclude legitimate advice or advocacy consistent 
with these Rules.” The proviso raises two questions. First, what is “advice or advocacy”? The 
phrase comes from former comment 3 to Rule 8.4(d), which applied to lawyers only “in the 
course of representing a client.”276 Thus it is not clear that “legitimate advice or advocacy” 
includes other activities, such statements at a bar event, CLE program, or law school class. 
And what advice or advocacy is legitimate? There seem to be no cases construing that 
term in the former comment. 277 The Ethics Committee’s 2015 proposal provided: “Paragraph (g) 
does not prohibit lawyers from referring to any particular status or group when such references 
are material and relevant to factual or legal issues or arguments in a representation.”278 The 
Committee added that this proviso “is a clearer standard than ‘legitimate advocacy’ for 
disciplinary counsel and state courts to apply, as it incorporates concepts already known in the 
law—‘material’ and ‘relevant.’”279 Thus, the ABA’s decision to omit this phrase and to revert to 
the ”legitimate advocacy” phrase seems to be a deliberate choice to be vague. 
When is it “legitimate” to manifest “bias or prejudice”? By definition, a biased or 
prejudiced statement is unreasoned. Perhaps the “legitimate advocacy” proviso is a null set 
because it is never legitimate to make an unreasoned statement. Professor Haupt claims: “The 
terms ‘advice’ and ‘advocacy’ presuppose a basis in legal doctrine, that is, the shared 
methodology of the profession, rather than exogenous factors such as the religious, political, or 
philosophical beliefs of the professional.”280 Really? To begin with, this concept of “legitimate 
advice or advocacy” does not at all mirror the language of Rule 8.4(g).281 Moreover, many 
prominent lawyers have viewed their role as not just technicians of positive law, but as wise 
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counselors advising their clients on ethics and prudence as well as the law.282 This could include 
what Professor Haupt dismisses as “exogenous factors such as the religious, political, or 
philosophical beliefs of the professional.” Professor Haupt’s claim underscores the uncertain 
meaning of “legitimate advice or advocacy.” Again, a lawyer can only guess how a tribunal 
might apply this proviso in a given case. 
Even if the “legitimate advocacy” proviso were clear and broad, it would probably not 
save Rule 8.4(g). The First Amendment protects even speech that is “outrageous.”283 The bar 
may curb speech to prevent prejudice to the administration of justice, but outside that sphere 
lawyers should be as free to speak as anyone else—whether the bar considers their speech 
“legitimate advocacy” or not.284 
The extreme breadth and vagueness of the rule are exacerbated by the low “reasonably 
should know” standard of culpability and the “quasi-criminal” nature of the possible penalties.285 
To protect speech, the Supreme Court has imposed an “actual malice” requirement on 
defamation laws, even for civil liability.286 
For “quasi-criminal” penalties like disciplinary sanctions, a high degree of culpability is 
particularly important. In Virginia v. Black287 the Court struck down a statute that made the 
burning of a cross “prima facie evidence of an intent to intimidate a person or group of 
persons.”288 Thus the statute placed on the defendant a “burden of producing evidence tending to 
rebut the presumption” of an intent to intimidate,289 even though the burden remained on the 
state to prove that intent.290 The Court held that “a State, consistent with the First Amendment, 
may ban cross burning” only if it is “carried out with the intent to intimidate.”291 
By contrast, Rule 8.4(g) could impose of “quasi-criminal” penalties for speech (including 
speech on political issues) even if it were admitted that the accused honestly believed that her 
statements did not discriminate if, in the subsequent opinion of the members of the tribunal, the 
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statements were discriminatory. That standard clearly violated the principles laid down in cases 
like Virginia v. Black. It “would create an unacceptable risk of the suppression of ideas.”292 
Some supporters of Rule 8.4(g) analogize to the ABA’s Code of Judicial Conduct,293 
which provides: “A judge shall not, in the performance of judicial duties, by words or conduct 
manifest bias or prejudice . . . .”; and “A judge shall require lawyers in proceedings before the 
court to refrain from manifesting bias or prejudice” on enumerated bases.294 There are two 
problems with the analogy. First, the code for judges is limited to “the performance of judicial 
duties” and “proceedings before the court.” It does not encompass law-related debates, bar 
gatherings, law school classes, and other activities covered by Rule 8.4(g). 
Second, the role of judges in the legal system differs greatly from that of lawyers. Judges 
must be impartial; lawyers are expected to be zealous, partisan advocates. Note that the judicial 
code includes “political affiliation” among the prohibited bases of “bias or prejudice;” Rule 
8.4(g) does not. It undermines the administration of justice if a judge favors a political party, 
even outside “the performance of judicial duties.” It does not undermine justice if a lawyer 
favors a political party at a public debate or bar event, or in her law office. The rules for judges 
are stricter because their duties are stricter. 
Professor Haupt sees no problem with applying Rule 8.4(g) to presentations in a CLE 
program. She posits a speaker who has “articulated the arguments expressed in” dissents of 
Supreme Court justices.295 Such statements satisfy the rule because they “would be squarely 
based on legal doctrine.”296 Personal opinions may be restricted because the “primary purpose 
[of CLE programs] is not for an individual lawyer to speak his own mind.”297 This is a troubling 
claim. First, dissents by justices are just dissents; they are not the law any more than anyone 
else’s opinions. And what if a lawyer quotes a dissent and then adds “I agree”? Or gives 
additional reasons for agreeing with a dissent. If a lawyer may reiterate a dissenting opinion, why 
should any other speech that is not otherwise illegal be barred by Rule 8.4(g)?  
More important, CLE programs are not limited to technical exegeses. It is often an 
important part of CLE programs “for an individual lawyer to speak his own mind.” Does 
Professor Haupt believe that a lawyer who does this is unprofessional and may be punished if, in 
the opinion of a disciplinary tribunal, a statement “manifests bias or prejudice”? If so, then the 
fears of critics of the rule are fully justified. 
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Free speech is important not only to the speaker but also to listeners.298 In Gentile Justice 
Kennedy noted: “To the extent the press and public rely upon attorneys for information because 
attorneys are well-informed, this may prove the value to the public of speech by members of the 
bar.”299 A lawyer speaking in a CLE program or law school—indeed, anywhere—may convince 
listeners because the lawyer may have some expertise that listeners lack and may have given the 
topic more study and thought than listeners had. To silence the speaker by threat of professional 
punishment denies the rights of listeners who may find her statements entirely persuasive. 
Professor Gillers argues that any First Amendment issues raised by Rule 8.4(g) can be 
handled in case-by-case litigation.300 Dean Deborah Rhode also argues that we can trust 
disciplinary committees and courts not to apply the rule to protected speech.301 This is not how 
the First Amendment works. Those subject to speech restrictions are entitled to know in advance 
what the boundaries are; they cannot be forced into case-by-case Russian roulette in which a 
wrong guess about the scope of a rule can destroy one’s career.302 
An earlier draft of comment 3 said the rule “does not apply to . . . conduct protected by 
the First Amendment.”303 Since this statement merely acknowledged the existence of the 
supreme law of the land, it should not have saved the rule from its unconstitutional breadth and 
vagueness. However, even this concession was dropped in the final comment. Professor Gillers 
argues that such a comment is unnecessary because “[a]ny lawyer charged with violating Rule 
8.4(g) remains free to argue that as applied to his or her conduct the rule is constitutional. They 
[sic] will be able to do that whether or not the rule says, for example, ‘subject to the First 
Amendment.’”304 Gillers is right here; if a rule is constitutionally defective, adding “subject to 
the First Amendment” will not save it. Again, citizens are not obliged to play case-law roulette; 
in order not to “chill” protected speech, a law must be clear and precise about what is 
forbidden.305 Rule 8.4(g) is not. 
E. The End of Free Speech? Perhaps proponents of Rule 8.4(g) do not intend to comply 
with First Amendment precedent; perhaps they intend to initiate a “cultural shift” in the meaning 
of the First Amendment and of the role of free speech in our society. It may once have been 
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axiomatic that free speech protected not only thoughts we like but also “the thought we hate.”306 
Being offended by the speech of others was once considered a small price for vigorous debate in 
a democracy. The political right strived to muzzle speech; the left struggled to keep it free. Now 
the left seeks to throttle speech, as in college speech codes307 and cases like R.A.V.308 Proponents 
of the rule cite the special role of lawyers, but they acknowledge no value in free speech for 
lawyers or anyone else. The speech code imposed by 8.4(g) may not be the end goal but merely 
one more step in the campaign to end free speech and to substitute a standard of partisan political 
correctness for what any American is allowed to say. 
 
V. Should the Bar Dictate Employment Law and What Clients Lawyers May Reject? 
 To “discriminate” means to choose. In a free society, individuals are generally allowed to 
make their own choices; in authoritarian societies, government restricts freedom by dictating a 
how citizens must behave in a wide range of situations. In a free society, government restricts 
liberty and mandates behavior only when there are compelling reasons to do so and restrictions 
on freedom do not trammel on important rights of conscience. In America today the federal, 
state, and local governments restrict choices on some bases and not others. 
Should the legal profession restrict the freedom of choice of lawyers when our 
governments choose not to? Some argue that the “special responsibilities and ethical duties of 
lawyers to clients, the public, and the legal profession” require that they “be held to higher 
ethical standards.”309 These higher standards are called “essential to maintain the integrity of the 
legal profession and those who represent it.”310 This is certainly true with respect to activities of 
lawyers that could deceive clients or impair the administration of justice, but it does not seem 
that special employment rules are necessary to “maintain the integrity of the legal profession.” 
Consider one effect of rule 8.4(g): it abolishes mandatory age-based retirement policies 
for law firm partners. The Age Discrimination in Employment Act exempts partners from the 
general prohibition on such policies.311 Rule 8.4(g) forbids discrimination based on age and 
makes no exception for mandatory-retirement policies for partners. The Committee Report 
supporting the rule notes that the ABA had previously adopted a recommendation against age 
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limits for partners,312 but it seems that no state has made this position a binding rule. The                                     
Committee’s reference to the prior ABA action shows that it recognized the issue, but it said 
nothing about moving from a recommendation to a mandate.313 
Rule 8.4(g) also forbids discrimination on the basis of “marital status.” This is even more 
remarkable. Hundreds of laws make distinctions based on marital status, as the Supreme Court 
noted in its same-sex marriage decision.314 Health insurance plans, for example, often include the 
insured’s spouse. A law firm with such a plan discriminates on the basis of marital status, which 
would violate the rule. There seems to have been no discussion of this major consequence of the 
new rule. If those involved were simply unaware of this effect, they were incredibly careless.  
The rule forbids discrimination on many other bases—such as sexual orientation, gender 
identity, and socioeconomic status—that are not illegal in many states. As noted,315 the 
expansion of Rule 8.4 to conduct that is merely related to the practice of law and does not 
interfere with the administration of justice raises many novel questions for the employment 
practices of lawyers regarding these bases, such as whether a firm can hire associates only from 
top-tier law firms.316 
Suppose, for example, that a state bar imposes religious hiring quotas on law firms in 
order to remedy religious discrimination. Whatever one thinks of such policies, it should be 
legislatures and not bar associations that decide whether to impose them.317 Once the bar 
arrogates authority to impose labor law for lawyers, where should it stop? If it bars 
discrimination on the basis of non-conforming gender behavior, should it bar discrimination on 
the basis of gambling, smoking, or carnivorism/vegetarianism? Should it dictate minimum (or 
maximum) compensation for lawyers? For non-lawyer employees of law firms? Maximum 
hours? Time-and-a-half for working nights or weekends? Again, the function of disciplinary 
rules is to protect the integrity of the justice system. They should not be used to comprehensively 
regulate the lives and practices of lawyers.  
Admission to the bar is not a privilege that a bar association may subject to conditions 
unnecessary to protect clients and the administration of justice; until now, professional rules have 
respected that limitation. To go further inevitably courts strife. In our diverse society, people 
                                                 
312 Report of the Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility 11 (Aug. 2016). The 
recommendation is contained in Resolution 10A of the ABA House of Delegates (Aug. 2007). 
313 The question of whether the new rule would prohibit age-based mandatory retirement policies was also 
raised by a question at a panel discussion in San Diego on February 5, 2016. A report of that event said 
that this was one of the questions to which no one had a clear answer. See Speakers Explore, supra note 
263. 
314 Obergefell v. Hodges, x U.S. x (2016) 
315 See supra notes 45-50 and accompanying text. 
316 This might be deemed discrimination on the basis of socioeconomic status. See supra note 188 and 
accompanying text. 
317 See Volokh, Speech Code, supra note 73, at 71, 72. 
47 
 
have very different opinions about proper behavior. It is inappropriate for a bar association to 
dictate propriety in matters where democratic processes have left people free to make their own 
choices. The imposition of restrictions is especially threatening to minorities that may have 
values different from those of those who control the bar. 
It is said that “Public confidence in the legal system follows from its general trust [and] 
its belief that all have equal access to justice in the legal system, free from discrimination by 
those who represent them.”318 However, Rule 8.4 specifically permits race discrimination in 
favor of certain groups.319 Moreover, the quoted statement refers only to discrimination against 
clients, and even for that claim no evidence is offered to support it. Lawyers are permitted to 
discriminate in employment in many ways, including discrimination “to promote diversity” and 
rejection of clients of whose positions the lawyer does not approve.320 Rule 8.4(g) does not 
purport to change this. Rather, it is a highly selective and politically partisan ban on certain kinds 
of speech and behavior. No evidence has been offered that this rule is needed to protect “[p]ublic 
confidence in the legal system,” and it seems highly unlikely that the rule is necessary to that 
purpose or that it would even improve public confidence. 
 
VI. How Did This Happen, and What Should Be Done? 
How could the august ABA have approved such a blatantly unconstitutional stricture? It 
would be comforting to ascribe the act to extraordinary carelessness, but that explanation is 
implausible. The defects of the rule are too obvious and the lawyers involved in the rule’s 
creation were too skilled and had too many warnings to have been unaware; they surely knew 
what they were doing. The ABA’s action, then, was political, even at the cost of flouting the 
Constitution.321 Apparently those behind Rule 8.4(g) oppose free speech for the politically 
incorrect and they hope that the prestige of the ABA would help to persuade first state courts and 
then the Supreme Court to gut the established constitutional principles protecting speech. 
The ABA’s action demonstrates once again how extremely politically partisan the ABA 
has become. In recent decades the ABA has increasingly taken partisan positions on many issues 
having nothing to do with the administration of justice or the professional conduct of lawyers.322 
What can be done about this? This is a vital question that demands more attention than it can be 
given here, but a few comments will be offered. 
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The ABA enjoys quasi-official status. It has the power to accredit law schools for 
important purposes and it plays an official role in the vetting of nominees for federal 
judgeships.323 This privileged status is premised on the ABA’s being a politically neutral 
umbrella organization representing the diversity of American lawyers. That premise is false. The 
ABA should be recognized for what it is; an ideologically driven interest group. The ABA’s 
privileged status should be revoked. If that is not possible, at least other organizations should be 
given equal status with the ABA. For example, the Federalist Society could be given the same 
power to accredit law schools that the ABA now possesses alone. 
 
VII. Conclusion 
ABA Model Rule 8.4(g) violates the First Amendment. It also regulates conduct by 
lawyers that does not interfere with the administration of justice or injure clients, which is not an 
appropriate function of the bar. Since the ABA will not repeal this rule any time soon, the next 
best solution is for lawyers to oppose it and prevent its adoption by the states. Where the rule is 
adopted, courts should pronounce it unconstitutional on its face. 
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